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l INTRODUCTION 
It has been· a while since license plates were a constitutional topic. 
Twenty .. odd years ago it was New ;Hampshire's "Uve Free or Die" plate 
that was in the spotlight.~ The Maynards, Jehovah's Witnesses who 
disagreed with the motto • s message, successfully argued that the state 
violated their free speech rights when it required them to display the motto 
on their cars.2. According to the Supreme Court, "(t]he First Amendment 
protects the right of individuals to·hold a point of yiew different from the 
majority and . to' refuse . to foster .· . ·. an idea they .find morally 
objectionable."~ Although established in the context of a four .. word motto 
that was inches tall at best, this free speech precedent has grown and 
branched far beyond this limited type of expression. 4 
Now, license pl~tes have again become the source of a free speech 
controversy. The constitutional angle, however, has shifted. The argument 
is no longer that a state forces individuals to use their private property as 
1. s~~ Wooley v. Maynard, 43Q U.S. 70S, 707 (1977) (New Hampshire required that non .. 
commerciiU vehicles bear license plates embos'Sed with the state motto, "Uve Free or Die," and 
made it a misdemeanor to "knowingly obscure .•• the figures or letters on any number plate.") 
(quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 263:1, 26~:27~ (Supp. 197S)). 
2. Id. at 707,717. 
3. /d. at 71S. · 
4. The constitutional principles that condemn government efforts to compel expression stem 
from the early cases of West VirginiD Stat~ Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943) 
(ipvalidating pledge of allegiance and flag salute requirements) and Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717. The 
contexts in which this doctrin<' applies now include media compelled access requirements, ~.g., Pac. 
Gm & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n, 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986), compelled participation in parades, 
~.,.,Hurley v, lrilh·A.meriCD" Gay, Lubimt & Bisuual Group, Inc., SIS U.S. 5S1, SS9 (i99S), 
compelled contributions to unions, ~.g.,A.bood v. D~troit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209,211 (1977), 
and compelled contributions to marketing associations, e.g .• Gliclcmtua v. Wileman Bros. & EUiott, 
Inc., 521 U.S. 457,460 (1997). . 
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"mobile billboard[s]"5 for messages with which they disagree. Rather, the 
focus is on state "specialty license plate" programs that allow individual 
drivers to choose to buy a plate that advertises a particular organization's 
name, logo, or motto.6 The current constitutional issue is whether the First 
Amendment permits,' or in fact requires,8 a state to provide its citizens 
with this option. · 
Two plates, available in several state$, raise both sides of the current 
controversy. The "Choose· Life" plate, authorized by state.legislatures to 
be produced and distributed in both Florida9 and Louisiana, 1? presents one 
side of the controversy. While both states offer a range of other license 
plate choiees, 11 pro-choice. groups sued, arguing that, with the "Choose 
Life" plate, the government unconstitutionally aligned itself with a 
controversial political message. 12 A .federal district courtin Florida rejected 
S. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 71S. . 
6. Under specialty Ji(:ellsc plate programs, groups or organizations can apply, pursuant to 
· established procedures, for license plates that fea,ture iome or all of the following: the group's name 
or initials, its logo, or its mOtto. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc: v. Glendening, 954 
F. Supp. I 099, 1100 (D. Md. 1997) (explaining that specialty plates "may '*e the fonn of either: 
a 'non-logo' plate, bearing a special tag number and the name, initials, or abbreviation of the name 
of the organizatiQn; or a 'logo' plate, bearing a special tag number, the niUlle, initials, or 
abbreviation of the name of the organization, and an emblem or logo that symbolizes the 
organization") (citing Mo. Coos ANN., Transp.JI § 13-619(g)(l)(i-ii) (1992 & Supp. 1996)). 
7. See Henderson v. Stalc;ler, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595.(i()() (E.D. La. 2000) (finding that 
the Constitution does not permit states to is$ue "Choose Ufe" specialty plate). 
8. . See Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1105 (finding that the Constitution does not permitstates 
to refuse to issue speci~ty plates with confederate flag logos). 
9. The Florida "Choose Ufe'' ~lates bear the motto alol}g with a crayon drawing of two 
smiling children. The proceeds from the plates are split between the state and organizations that 
counsel women to choose adoption and provide for their material needs when they do. The Florida 
legislature initially authori7.ed the plates' issuance in 1998, but then-governor Lawton ChileS vetoed 
the measure. The legislatUre authorized the issuance again in 1 ~. ~ Jeb Bush became govemo.-. 
He signed the bill into law. Cristin Kellogg, PtYJ·li/f Floridillm Fight for Right to Drive Home a 
Point; NOW Stalls "Choose Ufe" Platu, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A2. Several lawsuits 
followed. Pursuant to one of them, a state court judge issued a preliniin~ injunction prohibiting 
issuance of the plates. After an appellate court ruled that the case should be moved to a'different 
jurisdiction, the state began t() issue the plates. John P~nti & Antigone Barton, Florida Selling 
Tags Despite Court Tangle, P AUd BEAOI PosT, Aug. 12, 2000, at I A. 
I 0. Louisiana's "Choose Ufe" plate bears the motto along with a stork with a baby in a sling 
hanging from its beak.· The legislature authorized issuance of the plate by statute. See LA. RBV. 
STAT. ANN. § 47:463.61 (West 2000). Pursuant to a constitutional challenge, a federal district court 
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting production of the plates. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d 
at 602. 
11. At the time of the lawsuit challenging the denial of the confederate flag logo plate, 
Maryland issued specialty plates to 236 organizations. Some •• Free Sttite,''SroART NEWS, Mar. 12, 
1997, at A8 [hereinafter SOIM "Free Sta~"]. At the time of its lawsuit, Ploridah~ 51 specialty 
plates. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2. · . 
12. See Hildreth v. DickinSQn, No. 99-S83..CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at 
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the argument,13 while a federal district court in Louisiana accepted it as the 
basis for granting a preliminary injunction forbidding . the plates' 
distribution.14 According to the Louisiana.court, the Constitution forbids 
state legislatures from making the "Choose Life'' plates available to their 
citizens because they want to promote the pro-life message.15 
The Confederate flag logo specialty plate sought by the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans ·(~CV) in several states represents the other side of 
the controversy. 16 While some states offer drivers the option of purchasing 
the specialty plates, 17 others have recalled18 or refused to authorize19 plates 
with the flag logo because it is perceived by other citizens as offensive.20 
A federal district court in Maryland invalidated the Motor Vehicle 
Administration's recall of the flag logo plates, holding that the state could 
not constitutionally "[advance] the viewpoint of those offended by the flag 
and [discourage] the viewpoint of those proud of it. "21 Another federal 
court invalidated the Virginia legislature's refusal to authorize the flag 
logo plate, accepting22 the plaintiffs' claim that the Constitution requires 
*2-3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999); Henderson, 112 F. Supp. at 591. 
13. Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LIDUS 22503, at *21 (dismissing case as not ripe, but 
suggesting that the substantive arguments were meritless). 
14. Henderson, 112 P. Supp. 2d at 602. 
15. ld, at 598 (asserting that the state may "appropriate[) funds to promote adoption and 
discourage abortion" but "once [it] creates a forum where viewpoints are expressed, it mu$t be 
viewpoint neutral,). 
16. The Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) has sought Confederate flag tags in Alabama. 
North Carolina. Georgia, Tennessee, Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia. See infra notes 129· 
201 and accompanying text. 
17. Confederate flag plates for the group are available in Alabama. North Carolina, Georgia, 
Tennessee and Maryland. Sons of Confederate Veterans Get South Carolina Battle Flag Tags, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at 82 [hereinafter SCV South Carolina]. 
18. A federal district court invalidated Maryland's attempt to recall the plates. ·Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 P. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Md. 1997). 
19. See Rex Bowman, Suit Seeks Rebel Flag License Plate: Free Speech Issue Is Cited in 
Case Filed in Federal Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 24, 1999, at 85. 
20. See, e.g., Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100 (stating that Maryland plates were recalled 
because of .. apparent negative racial connotations of the logo design displayed on the plate"); 
Bowman, supra note 19, at 85 e'[F]Iagless SCV license plate came about after black lawmakers 
in the house of Delegates reminded colleagues that the Rebel flag, popular among hate groups, 
offends many blacks wbo see it as a symbol of past racial hatred. j; Jobn Commins, McAfee Plmu 
Race for 13th House Term, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs, Jan. 17,2000, at B2 ("[B]ill to honor Sons of 
Confederate Veterans with specialty license plates was stalled in House Calendar Committee. 
Members of the General Assemblf s Black Caucus complained that the plates featured a logo 
displaying the Confederate flag."). 
21. Glendening, 954 P. Supp. at 1104-05. 
22. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CVOOS301, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 538 (W.D. Va Jan. 18, 2001). 
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the state to make the flag logo plate available to those drivers who want to 
publicize its message.23 
Like the earlier New Hampshire license plate case,24 the current license 
plate controversy is ostensibly cabined by its context-a complex political 
diatribe simply cannot fit on the limited space devoted to "speech" on any 
specialty license plate. Again, however, the free speech implications 
extend. beyond the confines of the license plate context. At issue more 
generally is a government's authority to be selective when it subsidizes 
private speakers. This is an issue unresolved by the Supreme Court, which 
has in some cases validated the government's authority to be selective25 
and in others limited it,26 without thoroughly explaining the constitutional 
principles that guide its judgments. 27 The license plate controversy thus 
provides an opportunity to develop these principles in a limited context, 
from which resolution of the government's authority to pick and choose 
among private speakers in a variety of other contexts can grow. 
Part I describes the current specialty license plate controversy. It 
describes the legislative approval process used in most states, and more 
specifically details the legal challenges to states' issuance of"Choose Life" 
plates and refusal to issue plates with the Confederate flag. Part ll sets out 
the constitutional background against which the specialty plate 
controversies take place, noting that government officials both among and 
within states differ as to whether, according to the existing categories in 
constitutional doctrine, their programs constitute a type of "government 
speech" or rather constitute private speech "forums." Part m examines the 
strUcture of the current specialty plate programs in light of free speech 
values and the restrictions on the government's ability to be "selective" 
among private speakers. Part m demonstrates that specialty plate programs 
are private speech forums rather than nonforum government/private speech 
interactions, for which a greater degree of governmental discretion to be 
selective is allowed. As private speech forums, Part m argues that most of 
the. current specialty plate programs violate the Constitution. Specifically, 
the range of legislative discretion to enact or reject legislation is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the limits on discretion that apply to an 
administrator of a speech forum. Part N explains how states can structure 
and administer a constitutional specialty plate program by moving it away 
·23. ld.; Bowman, supra note 19, at B5 ("[T]he state can't bar speech solely because it's 
unpopular or offensive.''). 
24. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,587-88 (1998) (finding 
selectivity pennissible in context of arts funding). 
26. See, e.g., Rosenbergerv. Rector& VisitorsofUniv.ofVa., 515U.S. 819,844-45 (1995) 
(finding selectivity impermissible in context of student publication funding). 
27. See id.~ see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 583-84. 
·' 
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from the legislature to an entity that can apply clear~ non-discriminatory 
access standards in a consistent way that can be subjected to meaningful 
judicial review. 
ll. THE SPECIALTY PLATH CONTROVERSY 
A The Specialty License Plate Approval Process 
Specialty license plates acknowledge a group or cause on the portion 
of the plate not devoted to the letter/number identifying configuration. 28 
Drivers typically pay an extra fee for the plates, 29 which either goes to a 
state-designed cause or is ~lit between the state and the group or cause 
acknowledged on the plate. Although available in some states before the 
late 1980's, 31 the trend towards adopting such programs surged after 1987, 
when Florida issued a plate commemorating the space shuttle Challenger. 32 
Since its issuance, the Challenger plate has generated more that thirty 
million dollars for space-related scholarships arid research. 33 Now, more 
than forty states have specialty license ,Plate programs, 34 with some states 
offering well over a hundred choices. 3 
Groups that seek specialty plates are generally motivated both by their 
money-making potential and the recognition that they bring to the 
advertised cause. 36 Even if it does not reach the tens of millions generated 
28. This distinguishes specialty license plates from so-dllled-•'vanit)l'licenie plates. on which 
drivers can choose their letter/number configuration. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 
597 n.5 (B.D. La. 2000). 
29. FLA. STAT.§ 320.08056 (2000) .(1isting fees forspecialtyplites of fifteen to twenty-five 
dollars); State Grabs Half of Funds Raised by spedDlty License Plates, COPLEY NBWS SERVICE, 
Nov. 2, 1999 (stating that California drivers pay from twenty to fifty dollars per year for specialty 
plates) [hereinaftet State Grabs HalfJ. · 
30. See, e.g., State Grabs Half, supm note 29 ("Half of the money paid for •special interest• 
·license plates doesn't benefit the intended causes,. but instead .. goes to DMV for overhead or to a 
separate fund for other environmental projects.j. 
31. Ste, t.g., Ark. Putting Brakes on Sptcialty V~hiclt Tag;, COM. APPaAi., Apr. 21. 1997, 
at 83 ( .. Specialty tags came to Arkansas in the 1970s.") [hereinafter Ark. Putting Breaks]. 
32. Carlos Sanchez, TUtU Plate Va1Vties to Reach 100 This Year, ~RT WOR11f STAR-
TEi..EORAM, Aug. 11, 1997, at 8. 
. 33. Ark. PuUing Braka. supm ·note 31, at 83. 
34. NPR Morning EditiOn: Ucmse Plate Speech Contmwrsy(NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 30, 
1998) (Transcript No. 98043014-21 0) ( .. Forty-three stata have specialty license plates. 'j (statement 
of Cheryl Devall). 
35. See, e.g., Ledyard IGng,BUI Proposua "Choose Ufe" Ucenu Plate, VIRGINIAN-PILoT, 
Jan. 18, 1999, at 85 (stating that Virginia offers 'troughly 150 specialty plates"); William Weir, 
Special Interests Are Bting Given License to Fill, HARTR>RDCOURANT. June 7, 1999, at A3 (•'New 
York's DMV Web site lists almost 200 different special interat plates."). 
36. See, e.g., Sutanne Hoholik, CASA Plates to Aid Abused Children, SAN ANTONIO 
ExPREss-NEWs, Oct 27. 1998, at 1 B (stating that child abuse license plate campaign's purpose has 
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by some of the most popular plates, funding from the plates can literally 
"save the day" for many causes.37 Groups view the plates as a means to 
"spread the message" to · members of the public who are unaware of it, 38 
and interpret the purchase of plates a~ an expression of support from the 
public.39 Similarly, individuals who buy the plates do so both to help fund 
the identified organization or cause; and to publicly express their 
ideological support for it.40 According to a spokesperson for 3M, the 
company that developed the reflective sheeting that allows for the 
manufacture of the plate graphics, specialty pl~tes are "kind of a win-win 
de~l. People only spend the extra money if they want to. "41 
All states have minimum·requirements that groups must meet to apply · 
for specialty plates; These requirements usually relate to the expected 
profitability of the plate. · In Florida, for example, organizations must 
submit a scientific sample survey indicating that at least 15,000 motor 
vehicle owners intend to purchase the plate, 42 an application fee of up to 
$60,000 to defray the state's plate-related expenses,4 and a short-term and 
long-term marketing plan and financial analysis outlining anticipated 
revenues and planned expenditures.44 Applicants for specialty plates can 
fail at this point in the process by not m~eting the profitability guarantee 
requirements.45 · 
"two goals: to raise money and to increase awareness of child abuse''). 
37. See, e.g., Margo Harakas, Some Might Say It's a Ucenst to Print Monty, but Florida's 
51 Specially Plates Have Raised Almost $157 Million for Good Causes •. : .. , SUN·SENTINEL, May 
30, 2000, at ID ("[Florida's] State of the Arts plate .. . has pumped more than $270,000 into. 
Broward County's planned artists • housing project."); Roberta Scruggs, Loon Plates Save the Day: 
Maine Parks Have Cashed In, PORTLAND PRESs HERAlD, Aug. 10, 1997, at 120 (''The loon plate 
arrived to save the day in what many people consider the darkest hour of Maine's park system."). 
38. See, e.g., Adriana Colindres, Biil Signed for New Breast Cancer Awareness l'lates,ST ATE 
1.-REG., Aug. 1, 1998, at 6 (explaining that breast cancer awareness plate is ugoing to spread the 
message about mammograms") (quoting an interested citizen). 
39. Scruggs, supra note 37, at 120 ('"The [state] employees feel.supported by the people of 
Maine [who purchase the loon plate] .... They're giddy. It's been a wonderful thing."') (quoting 
a state official). 
40. See, e.g., Hoholik, supra note 36, at 1 B(asserting that a new Texas child abuse phite "will 
let motorists dispJay their concern about child abuse-and do something about it"). 
41. Harakas, supra note 37, at 1 D. 
42. FLA. STAT.§ 320.08053(l)(b) (2000). . 
43. Id. § 320.08053(1)(c). 
44. ld. § 320.08053 (l)(d); see also Robert B. Gunnison, State's Drivers May Have Too 
Much on Their Plates, S.F. CHRON.1 June 13, 1999, at 3fZ1 ("[Specialty] plates need to reach a 
5,000 oo0rder threshold before the state can issue ·them."); SCV South Carolina, supra note 17; at 
B2 (explaining that South Carolina requires groups to pay a $4,000 fee to cover initial production 
costs or 400 prepaid applications). 
45. See, e.g., Gunnison, supra note 44, at 31Z1 ("[California specialty plates] that never saw 
the light of day were plates for the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary, the Coachella Valley Mountain 
Conservancy, the Gene Chappie Heritage Network, the American Heritage Rodeo Foundation and 
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Most states also require that specialty plate applications that meet the 
minimum requirements be approved in their own pieces of legislation, 
meaning that both houses of the legislature must pass them and the 
governor must sign them into law .46 Thus, applications for specialty plates 
may also fail at one of the numerous stages in the legislative process. 47 
Unlike in the minimum guidelines noted above, there are rarely articulated 
standards to guide elected officials' judgments.48 To the extent that they 
offer explanations for approving or disapproving special plate applications, 
their explanations relate generally to their perceptions of the public interest 
and whether the proposed specialty plate would serve it.49 
As with any other law, a decision on a specialty plate application is 
subject to the vagaries of .the legislative process. Whether a particular 
specialty plate makes it through the gauntlet depends most fundamentally 
upon the relative strengths and interplay of the political forces in favor of 
and opposed to the application. so So, for example, in Arkansas the 
legislature refused to authorize specialty plates for the Knights of 
Columbus because of fears that other groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, 
would want them, too.51 In California, several years ago, some "well-
placed telephone calls" by Nancy Reagan got a Ronald Reagan Lib~ 
plate approved despite a purported ban on all specialty plate approvals. 2 
plates for cars owned by firefighters!'); Harakas, supra note 37, at lD (quoting Florida motor 
vehicle department spokesperson who stated that application requirements assure that plates are 
•'not authorized willy-nilly''). 
46. See, e.g., S. 1329, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (eliminating requirement that 
specialty plates be approved by legislature and instead requiring direct application to Department 
of Motor Vehicles); Colindres, supra note 38, at 6 (describing specialty plate .. signed into law'' by 
Illinois governor); Hoholik, supra note 36, at 1 B ('"To offer specialty plates, an agency or university 
must secure a state lawmaker as a sponsor and win approval from the Legislature!'). 
47. See, e.g., Michael Gardner, Boy Scout Ucense Plate Splits Lawmakers Over Bilu Issue, 
COPLEY NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 2000 ("Tied in political knots by the Boy Scouts, a Senate panel 
sidestepped a showdown Tuesday by approving conflicting bills on the issuance of special fund-
raising license plates.''); Organ Donor Ucense Plate Honoring Payton Moves in Senate, STATE NET 
CAPITOLJ.-Ju.., Mar. 27, 2000 (stating that, although Senate panel approved organ donor specialty 
plate in honor of Walter Payton, "[t)be legislation faces an un~n future in the House"). 
48. Se~ Sen. Tom Lee. Controversy Over "Choose .. License Plate Misses Whole Point of 
Choice, P Al.M BBACi POsT, May 19, 1998, at 1 SA (stating that in Florida, ""the Senate has imposed 
nine policy questions to ensure that the license plate serves a broad public purpose''). 
49. See, e.g., id. 
SO. Su, e.g., Dan Walters, A Legislatun Unhmnpered By Rules, SAN DIEOO UNION-TRIB., 
Aug. 11, 1998, at B-6:1 (describing how, despite a ban on passage of new specialty licerue plate 
applications, another transportation bill was "'hijacked" and an AIDS research specialty license plate 
authorization was written in and passed by the legislature). 
Sl. Ark. Putting BrtJices, supra note 31, at 83 ("Allowing one group but not another to get 
its own tag could lead to a lawsuit.''). 
52. Carl Ingram, Senator Hopes to Decelerate Move to Specialty License Plates, L.A. TIMEs, 
Mar. 26, 2000, at A24. 
2001) FREE SPEECH AND SPECIALTY UCENSE PLATES 427 
More recently in that state, the Boy Scouts had the legislature "tied in 
political knots" as a Semite committee both adopted a broad anti-bias 
policy for issuing specialty plates and authorized a plate for the Scouts 
even though the group's membership policy violates the provision. 53 
According to one side, anyone supporting the anti-discrimination measure 
was "voting against the Boy Scouts. "S4 On the other side stood the Senate's 
President Pro Tempore, a "San Francisco Democrat [who] represents a 
large gay population" and was poised to "use his considerable power to 
derail the Boy Scout bill. "55 Even before the Boy Scout dispute arose, the 
anti-discrimination rules 'had been trimmed to ·remove a reference to 
gender discrimination in order "to take care of the Girl Scouts," who also 
wanted specialty plates.56 Finally, some states may allow religious 
symbols, such as crosses, on specialty plates, 57 while others may deem 
them too controversial. Explained one Alabama legislator of the 
requirement that a white church steeple be removed from a proposed 
Martin Luther King, Jr. plate, "We've got to be sure what we do here 
doesn't open us up to court suits."58 
B. The Current Controversies 
1. "Choose Life" 
The "Choose Life" license plate is the brainchild, so to speak, of 
Marion County Commissioner Randy Harris, who conceived the idea in 
1996 while stuck in Ocala, Florida traffic. 59 In 1997, Harris founded 
Choose Life, Inc., a nonprofit organization designed to "work with 
interested citizens within Florida and other states to create a specialty 
license plate with the slogan 'Choose Life,' the proceeds of which would 
be used to facilitate and encourage adoption as a positive choice for 
women with unplanned pregnancies."60 At the time of its application, 
Florida law required the group to raise a $30,000 application fee and obtain 




57. See, e.g., Some "Frt!e Stale," supra note 11, at AS ("Christian crosses [are] the 
centerpiece of some other [Maryland Motor Vehicle Association]-approved logos.'1. 
58. Regional News Digest, CHA1TANOOOA TIMES. Apr. 30, 2000, at 83 (quoting Rep. Jack 
Venable) . 
. 59. Choose Life, Inc.: About Us, at http://www.choose-life.orglaboutus.html. 
60. Choose Life, Inc.: Our Purpose, at http://www.choo~life.org/purpose.html. 
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10,000 signatures.61 It took the group only 3Vz weeks to do so.62 State 
Senator Tom Lee sponsored the bill creating the plate in the Florida 
Legislature, where it passed both houses in early 1998.63 Then-Governor 
Lawton Chiles vetoed the bill, however, stating, "Simply because a 
particular political message is able to gamer a .majority of votes in the 
Florida Legislature does not mean that an official State of Florida license 
plate is the proper forum for debate on this-or any other-political 
issue."64 
Later that year, on the campaign trail, gubernatorial candidate Jeb Bush 
stated that he would sign such legislation if elected.65 After his election, 
Choose Life, Inc. again pressed its specialty plate application. Both houses 
of the legislature passed the legislation in 1999, and in that same year the 
new Governor Bush signed it into law. 66 On the authorized plate, the words 
"Choose Life" appear in childish crayon scrawl across the top, between the 
month and year stickers. A similarly colorful crayon-like sketch of smiling 
boy and girl faces, bent affectionately together, appears in the right-hand 
third of the plate's surface, the sanie size vertically as the plate's 
identifying letter/number configuration.67 The extra charge for the plates 
is $20 per year, with proceeds designated according to sales by county. 68 
The counties then must distribute the money to not-for-profit agencies that 
counsel and meet the needs of pregnant women who are committed to 
placing their children for adoption. 69 The legislation disqualifies 
organizations that provide abortion information, in addition to counseling 
and assisting women who choose adoption, from receiving funding.70 The 
National Organization for Women (NOW), along with others, brought suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the state's action.71 
61. FLA. STAT. § 320.08053(l)(b)-(c)(1997). The current requirement is a $60,000 
application fee and 15,000 signatures. FlA. STAT.§ 320.08053(1)(b)-(c)(2000). 
62. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2. 
63. /d. 
64. Press Release, ACLU, Florida ACLU Calls on Gov. Jeb Bush to Veto Two 
Unconstitutional Bills (May 7, 1999), http:l/www .aclu.orglnewsl1999/n050799a.html [hereinafter 
ACLU Press Release]. . 
65. CNNTalkbackUve: "Choose Life" Ucense Plate Causes Controversy in Florida (CNN 
television broadcast. Nov. 29, 1999) (Transcript No. 99112900Vl4)'[hereinafter TalkbackUvej. 
66. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2. 
67. See Choose Ufe Ucense Plate, at http://www.hsmv.state.fl.uslspecialtytagsltagchoose. 
html. 
68. See id. 
69. FLA. STAT. § 320.08058 (2000). 
70. Talkback Uve, supra note 65. 
71. NOW brought three different lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the state's 
approval of the plate. Cristin Kellogg, Pro-life Floridians Fight for Right to Drive Home a Point; 
NOW Stalls .. Choose Ufe" Plates, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A2 ('7o date, NOW has 
mounted _three lawsuits to keep Florida from being the first state in the country to sport the two-
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The crux of the free speech claim against the state 72 is that the plate 
represents an unconstitutional government choice to support an anti-
abortion message. 73 The government's response has several aspects. First, 
although Choose Life, Inc., is backed by anti-abortion groups such as 
Florida Right to Life,74 and amendments to change the wording to "Choose 
Adoption" were defeated several times in the legislature, 75 the plates' 
supporters consistently deny that the specialty plate sends an anti-abortion 
message.76 The law's initial author contends that the license plate "has 
nothing to do with a woman's right to choose an abortion."77 States the 
Choose Life spokesperson, "We are not in the pro ... life/pro-choice debate. 
This is a pro-adoption plate. "78 According to Governor Bush when asked 
about the plate after signing it into law, "It's a pretty tag, and it says 
'Choose Life,' and it's for adoption. If people want to politicize that, 
they'll politicize anything."79 
A second strain of the argument supporting the constitutionality of the 
"Choose Life" plates is that it is but one of many Florida specialty plates 
that bear a variety of different messages. Although many of these plates 
signify affiliation with particular state schools or support for professional 
sports teams, 80 others contain messages, such as advocating support for 
environmental causes or protecting endangered species,81 which are as 
. 
word slogan above its car bumpers .... [T]wo of the lawsuits have been dismissed or defeated!'). 
72. After the initial free speech clause challenges failed, see Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-
583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *21 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999), NOW brought 
another suit, arguing that the plates also violate the establishm~nt clause because the money that 
they bring in primarily aids religious organizations. Foes of "Choose Life" Plate Ask Court to 
Recalll3,000, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at 58 ("Abortion rights advocates asked a 
judge Thrirsday to recall a 'Choose Life' auto tag, saying the state has issued a tag with a biblical 
message quoted by anti-abortion activists."). · 
73. Talkback Live, supra note 65 ("It's a bill that very specifically talks about abortion and 
really is a state-sanctioned campaign against the right to choose abortion.") (statement of Elizabeth 
Toledo of NOW). • 
74. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 22, 2000) (stating that Choose Life, 
Inc. "has the backing of anti-abortion. groups like Florida Right to Life and conservative Christian . . 
groups statewide") (statement of Philip Davis) [hereinafter All Things Considered]. 
75. Talkback Live, supra note 65. 
76. See, e.g., id. ("Well, see, I dou't look at it as the state 'taking a side.' I look at it as the 
state allowing individuals that would like to purchase a plate that does help adoptions it [sic] t<> be 
able to do that.") (statement ofTom Gallagher, Aorida Education Commissioner); see also Kellogg, 
supra note 9, at A2 ("'The plates are not 'anti-' anything.") (statement of House bill sponsor Rep. 
Bev Kilmer). 
77. Lee, supra note 48, at 15A. 
78. All Things Considered, supra note 74 (statement of Russ Amerling). 
79. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2. 
80. See Specialty License Plates Index, . at http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/specialtytags 
/specialindex. html (listing 14 university plates and II professional sports team plates). 
81. ld. (Environmental cause plates include: "Conserve Wildlife," "Everglades River of 
·' 
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"political" and "controversial" as "Choose Life.''82 That the state facilitates 
a wide variety of groups and messages and that individual drivers have free 
choice to decide to pay the extra fee to support the organization or message 
renders state approval of any particular plate constitutional. 83 Pursuant to 
this strain of argument, the appropriate response of citizens who do not 
like the "Choose Life'; message is not a lawsuit, but is to seek recognition 
of their own group and message through the specialty plate process. 84 At 
the same time, however, in response to concerns that a completely wide-
open approval process could put undesirable messages on the state's 
roadways, legislators emphasize safeguards in the authorization procedure. 
According to the senator who sponsored the "Choose Life" plate, 
"legislative criteria" that ensure that a plate serves a broad public purpose 
"protect Floridians from those who might attempt to use the specialty 
license plate statute to advertise a negative fringe idea.''85 
The third strain of the argument in support of the constitutionality of 
the "Choose Life" plate emphasizes the discretion inherent in the 
legislative process. Under this line of argument, the creation of a particular 
specialty plate is a legislative act that requires no further constitutional 
justification than that enough votes existed to pass it. 86 That other 
Grass," "Indian River Lagoon," ''Large Mouth Bass," "Manatee,,. "Panther," "Protect Wild 
Dolphins.'' "Sea Turtle," '7ampa Bay Estuary," and "State Wildflower." Miscellaneous cause plates 
inClude: "Agriculture,'' ''Boy Scouts," "Challenger," ''Florida Arts, .. "Florida Educational," "Florida 
Salutes Veterans, .. "Florida Sheriffs Youth Ranches," "Florida Special Olympics," "Oid Scouts," 
"Invest in Children, .. "Keep Kids Drug Free,'' "Share the Road,'' "Political Athletic Leaguet "U.S. 
Olympic," and ''U.S. Marine Corps"). 
82. See Talkback Uve, supra note 65 (''Well, you know, I look at it, there are people that are 
very interested in saving manatees, and I will tell you there is an other [sic] side that politically 
[sic]. Some of the boat manufacturers and boat owners don't like the idea that they have to go at 
a very slow no-wake speed to protect manatees. They want to run their boats as fast as they can. It's 
a highly poUtical issue. So it's as political as anything else.'') (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida 
Education Commissioner). 
83. See ACLU Press Release, supra note 64 (arguing that the state can choose to allow 
political slogans on license plates, but that "once that is done the Constitution does not pennit the 
State to discriminate in the future on the basis of viewpoint"). 
84. Tallcback Uve, supra note 65 (''They want to give and talk about using abortion as a 
method of birth control, which I think is not a good thing to be promoting, but they have the right 
to go to the legislature and ask to do that. And they could get the money from it.") (statement of 
Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner). . 
85. Lee, supra note 48, at I SA; see also Tallcback Uve, supra note 65 (stating that the entire 
approval process provides assurance "on having a reasonable groupj. 
86. Tallcback Uve, supra note 65 (Florida has the "Choose Ufe" specialty plate "because they 
had the votes to have a tag to help fund adoptions as an alternative. I don't see a problem with 
that.'') (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner). 
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organizations apply and "simply don't make it through the process"17 is 
explicable as an appropriate result of the democratic system. 
Shortly after the legislature authorized the "Choose Life" specialty 
plates, the state ordered the manufacture of 10,000 of the plates, intending 
to distribute them as soon as they became available. 18 In one of the lawsuits 
challenging the state's action, a state judge preliminarily enjoined the 
distribution of the plates. 89 But after the appellate court held that the case 
should be transferred to a different jurisdiction, the state detennined that 
"the status of the law is that there is no legal impediment to the sale of the 
[plates]."90 As the plates were being sold, a state circuit court judge 
continued to consider th~ plantiffs' claims.91 
Initial sales of the "Choose life" specialty plate have been brisk. The 
state sold 750 plates in the first week that it was offered,92 and in the first 
twenty weeks sales of the plate generated $200,000.93 Choose Life, Inc. is 
actively. advertising the availability of the plates,94 reminding drivers that 
they need not wait until their renewal date to get the plates and offering a 
packet of reproducible flyers for those who want to "spread the word. 't9s 
It also plans to place billboards around the state publicizing the availability 
of the specialty plates and encouraging Floridians to "take a STAND for 
Ufe."96 It seeks sponsors of "pro-life billboards" to collaborate in the 
effort.97 
Choose life, Inc. seeks to extend the specialty license plate effort 
beyond Florida. It claims to be in communication with groups and 
individuals in thirty-five states that are interested in beginning the process 
and notes that license plate bills have been before legislatures of eleven 
additional states in the past year.98 In Virginia, a bill with the same crayon 
87. /d. (statement of Del. Richard Black, responding to whether legislature would have to 
grant the KKK a specialty tag). 
88. Judge Delays Sale of Choose Life Tags, SruARTNBWS, Feb. 9, 2000, at BS {explaining 
that the state had ordered plates and planned to begin distributing them in March). 
89. See id. (explaining that a judge blocked distribution of Florida's new "Choose Ufe .. 
license plates while she decided whether they amount to "a political statement against abortion"). 
90. All Things Considered, supra note 74 (statement of Robert Sanchez. Florida State 
Highway Dep't). · 
91. Choose Life Update, at http://www .choose-life.org/newsletter.html [hereinafter Choose 
Life Update] (NOW v. State of Florida& Dep't ofTransp., Case No. CV 001953, before Circuit 
Judge Nikki Ann Clarke). · 
92. AU Things Considered, supra note 74. 
93. Choose Life Update, supra note 91. 
94. /d. ("We have begun an extensive statewide grassroots·advertising effort to spread the 




98. Douglas Belkin, "Choose Life" Car Tags Stirring.. Up Debate Over Anti-Abortion Efforts, 
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drawing graphics as Florida passed the House and the Senate, but became 
fatally stalled on the issue of wording. 99 The bill passed the House after 
being changed from "Choose Ufe" to "Choose Adoption,"100 although its 
sponsor hof!d to change the wording back once the plate won Senate 
approval.10 The Senate Committee, however, wanted to change the word 
"choose" as well. un According to the House sponsor's legislative assistant, 
"Some of the people in the Senate were nervous because other House 
members were making the argument that if there is a pro-life tag then there 
could be a pro-abortion tag."103 When faced with the prospect of losing 
both words, the bill's sponsor removed it from consideration, vowing to 
introduce it again. 104 · 
In only one other state, Louisiana, has the specialty plate authorization 
been signed into law. Says an organizer of that "Choose Ufe" license plate 
campaign, "It's easy to get these things done in Louisiana because we have 
a very pro-life legislature."105 The bill in fact passed both houses of the 
legislature unanimously .106 In addition to the "Choose Life" motto, the 
Louisiana plate features a baby wrapped in a blanket dangling from the 
beak of the state bird, the brown pelican. 107 The extra charge for the plate 
is $25 per year, which, as in Florida, is to go to organizations that provide 
"counseling and other services intended to meet the needs of expectant 
mothers considering adoption for their unborn child. " 108 And, as in Florida, 
organizations "involved in counseling for, or referrals to abortion clinics, 
CHA1TANOoaA TIMES, July 23, 2000, at A15 C'Bills authorizing 'Choose Ufe' li~ plates have 
been propqsed in at least 10 states, said Russ Amerling, vice president of the organization."); 
Choose Ufe Update, supra note 91 ("This year Choose Ufe license plates went before the 
U:gislatures of California, Texas, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, West Virginia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama and Ohio.''); Robert Whereatt, The Week Ahead, 
STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2001, at 58 (Minnesota considers "Choose Ufe" plate). 
99. Belkin, supra note 98, at A15 ("In Virginia, state delegate Richard Black spc:mson:d a bill 
using Florida's 'Choose Ufe' design.''). . 
100. Tallcback Uve,. supra note 65 C'(W]e had to accept a modification to get it out of the 
House of Delegates.") (statement of Del. Richard Black). 
101. ld. ("[W]e had hoped to get it through the House of De1egates and hopefully to modify 
it back at a later time.") (statement of Del. Richard Black). 
102. ld. (stating that the Senate committee .. simply could not accept the word 'choose"') 
(statement of Del. Richard Black). 
103. Kellogg, supra note 9, at A2 (quoting Steve Whitener, legislative assistant to Del. Richard 
Black>. 
104. Be~n, supra note 98, at AI S ('"The Senate didn't like the word life, and they didn't like 
the word choose. They changed it to something like family friendly, so I had it stricken.") (quoting 
Del. Richard Black). . 
1 OS. /d. (quoting Peg Kenny). 
106. See Steve Ritea, Anti-Abortion Ucense Plate Drawing Fire, TIMBS-PICAYUNB, iu1y 19, 
2000, at A 1 (stating that sponsor of specialty plate bill watched it pass unanimously). 
107. Id. 
108. /d. 
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providing medical abortion-related procedures, or pro-abortion 
advertising" are disqualified from receiving funding.109 Organizations that 
receive money from the "Choose life" fund within the state treasury will 
be chosen by the "Choose Life Advisory Council," which, like the fund, 
is created by the plate-authorizing legislation. The Council will include the 
president or designee of the Ameri~an Family Association, the Louisiana 
Family Forum and Concerned Women of America, as well as other 
members chosen by them.110 
The New York-based Center for Reproductive Law and Policy brought 
suit on behalf of local residents and others, 111 challenging the 
constitutionality of the plates. Like the Florida Elaintiffs, they raised both 
free speech and establishn)ent clause claims.1 2 On AugUst 29, 2000, a 
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction directing the state to 
halt production of the "Choose Life" plate, 113 finding that the plan tiffs were 
likely to succeed on the merits of their free speech claim.114 . 
Like the Florida plaintiffs, the Louisiana plaintiffs argued that, by 
authorizing the "Choose Life'' specialty plate, the state unconstitutionally 
supported one point of view on a controversial public issue. 115 Louisiana's 
response differed in emphasis from Florida's. Rather than arguing about 
whether the plate "takes a side" on a controversial issue, Louisiana 
officials largely concede that the message expresses a particular 
viewpoint.116 The Louisiana representative who sponsored the legislation 
frankly acknowledged that the plate's message is anti-abortion.117 And, 
although the state argued that the availability of many specialty plate$ 
rendered the "Choose Life" plate constitutional, it primarily emphasized 
that the plate's message is valid because it is a reflection of the state's own 
109. /d. 
110. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (E.D. La. 2000), stay denied 2000 WL 
1875987 (E.D. La. 2000). 
111. ld. at 592 n.2;·Judge Temporarily Blocks "Choose Life'' License Plates, CHATTANOOGA 
TIMBs, Aug. 30, 2000, at A2 (explaining that suit was brought on behalf of New Orleans residents 
Russell J. Henderson, Doreen Keeler, Rabbi Robert H. LOewy, and the Greater New Orleans 
Section of the National Council of Jewish Women). 
112. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
113. /d. at 592. 
114. ld. at 596. ' 
115. /d. at 593;. Joe Gyan, Jr., Attorney Argues Against State"s Specialty Plate, 1HE 
ADVOCATE. Aug. 24, 2000, at lB (setting forth plaintiffs' attomef s argument that specialty plates 
approved by Louisiana legislature "[i]n general •.. don't express a viewpoint," but, with the 
"Choose Ufe, plate, the legislature has "gone a step further"). · 
116. Henderson, 112F. Supp. 2dat598 ("[D]efendants havemadeclearbytheirargumentthat 
there is no intent to be viewpoint neutral.,")~ 
117. Ritea, supra note 106, at At (stating that the plate is appropriate for Louisiana because 
the state "is, traditionally, a very anti-abortion state'") (quoting Rep. Shirley Bowler). 
·' 
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convictions. 118 According to the state, specialty license plates do not create 
a forum for private speech.119 Instead, every·specialty plate, because it is 
authorized "through [the state's] democratic process of legislative 
enactments," contains an "official statutory [message] by the state itself," 
which the state "makes ... available to those who choose an alternative 
state message instead of the one on the basic license plate."120 As 
government speech, specialty plate authorizations are not subject to the 
rule that prohibits viewpoint discrimination among private viewpoints.121 
Rather, argues Louisiana, the state may, "pursuant to democratic 
processes, ... [express] a preference for normal childbirth."122 
The district court in Florida dismissed the plate challengers' free speech 
claim as not rif!:, because the plaintiffs had not applied for a pro-choice 
license plate. 12 It also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the 
specialty program and the "Choose Ufe" plate authorization at issue 
created opg.ortunities for some to speak without limiting others' speech in 
any way.1 The district court in Louisiana rejected both of these 
arguments. 12S According to that court, "[b ]y the very act of injecting 'the 
State's position which has been legislatively sanctioned' into a forum, First 
Amendment injury occurs."126 ¥d, "[o]nce a forum has been created 
which allows viewpoint discrimination, it is unconstitutional from the 
moment the discriminatory forum. is created. " 127 Therefore, no pro-choice 
plate application was necessary for plaintiffs to bring their challenge. 128 
2. Confederate Flag Plates 
The Confederate flag specialty plate dispute began in Maryland. Unlike 
most states, which require legislative approval of specialty plates, 
Maryland allows its Motor Vehicle Administration (MV A) to issue 
118. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 593-95. 
119. ld. at 595. 
120. /d. (quoting Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition). 
121. Id. . 
122. /d. 
123. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LBXIS 22503, at *21 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). 
124. /d. at *20. 
125. Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d ai 600-01. 
126. /d. at 601. 
127. /d. 
128. Id. ("Once free speech has been abridged in such a manner, there is no case law 
supporting the proposition that those individuals wh(lse speech has been restrained in this particular 
forum must wait, a week, a month, or a year to have an opportunity to express an opposing 
viewpoint in that forum.''); Gyan, supra note 11 S, at 1 B (noting that a plaintiffs' attorney conceded 
that clients had not applied for a pRH:hoice plate but argued "that it would be 'futile' to get 
Louisiana lawmakers to vote for such a plate''). 
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specialty plates to non;.profit organizations that meet the qualification 
guidelines. 129 Over 350 specialty license plates, either with an 
organization's name and logos or with the name only, are available in 
Maryland. 130 Organizations that have such plates include 
alumni and alumnae groups, volunteer frre departments, 
veterans' groups (e.g., Vietnam Veterans of America), ... 
business groups and unions, churches and religiously 
affiliated groups (e.g., B'nai B'rith, Grace Baptist Church, 
and the Muslim American Community), political parties (both 
the Maryland Republican and Democrat parties and the 
Libertarian Party), and cause-advocating interest groups (e.g., 
the National Rifle Association).131 · 
Organizations generally can choose whether to apply for "n8,Jile-only" or 
"logo" specialty plates, with the latter costing slightly more.132 Before the 
Confederate flag logo controversy, the MV A had denied logo plates to two 
organizations, the Royal Order of Jesters, which wanted a naked Buddha, 
and the Anne Arundel County Professional Firefighters, which wanted the 
letters "FU."133 These organizations obtained name-only plates instead.134 
In June 1995, forty-two members of the SCV applied for a specialty 
plate. 135 The SCV is a non-profit organization of men who can demonstrate 
that an ancestor served honorably for the Confederacy in. the Civil W ar.136 
The SCV is a historical and educational organization dedicated to . 
"preserving and explaining Confederate heritage in proper historical 
perspective," which "publicly condemns racism and all hate groups.''137 In 
December 1996, the MV A issued seventy-eight plates with the SCV' s 
129. MD. CODE ANN., Transp.ll § 13-619 (2000). 
130. Marina Sarris, MVA Won't Chalknge Judge's Ruling on Tags: Group Allowed to Keep 
Confederate-Logo Plates, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 27, 1997, at 2B (noting that 3!58 groups have 
special organizational plates) [hereinafter MVA Won't Challenge]; Marina s.ns, MVA to Revoke 
Ucense Tags Bearing Confederate Flags: Complaints Led to Ag~ncy Action Against Plates, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 3, 1997, at I A (noting that 21 S organizations have logo plates and 128 have 
nall'KH)nly plates) [hereinafter MVA to Revoke]~ 
131. William J. Mertens, Battle Over the Battle Flag, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 3!5. 
132. MVA toRevoke,supranote 130,at IA(notingthatname-onlyplatescost$12, while logo 
plates cost $15). 
133. ld. 
134. ld. 
13S. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 9S4 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md. 
1997). 
136. ld. 
137. Curtis A. Carter, Confederate Flag and Free Speech, CQUJUER-J ., Mar. 2S, 1997, at 11 A. 
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name and logo, 138 which for-over 100 years has included the Confederate 
flag. 139 On the plate, the flag occupied approximately a two-inch square.140 
It was after issuance of the plates that members of the legislature 
became involved.141 The legislature's Black Caucus Joined with the state's 
NAACP to ask the MVA to recall the plates.14 The MVA did· so, 
explaining that its decision was "based on numerous, substantial 
complaints ... about the apparent negative racial connotations of the logo 
design displayed on the plate."143 It offered, however, to consider another 
~CV:applic~tion prop~sin~ "logo art~ork with an altemat!v~ design that 
IS not perceived as racist." 44 According to the MVA Adtruntstrator, who 
is an African-American, "I personally do not find the logo or the 
Confederate battle flag objectionable, but that's not the issue. There are a 
large number of Maryland citizens who find it objectionable, and we are 
a state agency, so it's our responsibility to be sensitive to the concerns of 
the public. "145 Said Governor Parris N. ·Glendening, supporting the MV A's 
recaU decision, ''The Confederate flag has taken on a symbolism over the 
years that many of us reject."146 
The SCV sued, arguing that the MV A's recall violated its free speech 
·nghts. 147 In "the near record time of 33 days,"148 the case went from 
complaint to a permanent injunction order issued without hearing. 149 The 
court held that the MV A recall of the SCV plates was unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination, "advanc [ing] the viewpoint of those offended by 
the flag and discourag[ingl the viewpoint of those proud of it."150 The 
138. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100. 
139. /d. 
140. Bonna M. de Ia Cruz, Senators OK Rebel License Tag, TENNESSEAN, May 18, 1999, at 
1 A (noting that Tennessee bill used Maryland plate as a model, which included the two-inch flag, 
and that, accon!ing to the bill's sponsor, Sen. Bobby Carter, "You can't hardly see it."). 
141. Some "Free St~te," supra note 11, at AS ("A state senator accused Maryland of 
sanctioning a 1racist symbol."'). 
142. See Tom Stuckey, Confederate Symbol on Lice~Ue Plates Bring$ Protests in Maryland, 
AUSTIN AMER.-STAn5MAN, Dec. 28, 1996, at A4 ("Maryland. doesn't need to go backwards with 
this Jim Crow mess.'~) (quoting Sen. Larry Young, chairman of the Legislative Black Caucus); id. 
('"We in the NAACP are surprised and disappointed that a state agency would cooperate in 
perpetuating such symbols as this one."') (quoting Hanley Norment, president of the state ·chapter 
of the NAACP). 
143. O.lendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1100 (quoting Pis' Mem. In Supp. Ex. 11). 
144. /d. at 1101 (ql.loting Pis' Mem. In Supp. Ex. 11). 
145. MVA to Revoke, supra note 130, at lA. 
146. /d. 
147. Carter, supra note 137, at 11A. 
148. !d. (stating that the case was "clear-cut" according to SCV member). · 
149. Glenden.ing, 954 F. Supp. at 1099 ("In view of the thorough briefing, no hearing is 
necessary under the Rules of this Court."); id. at 1101 ("Defen~ants have requested that the Court 
forego ruling on the preliminary injunction motion and reach the merits of the issues.''). 
150. ld. at 1104. 
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MV A decided not to appeal the district court's decision}51 The 
Confederate battle flag specialty plates y;emain available in Maryland~ 152 
For a period of time, approval of 'any further applications was delayed 
while the MV A and the legislature considered changes to the specialty 
plate program. A House of Delegates committee, however, killed a bill that 
would have abolished specialty plates, which, as one reporter noted, "are 
popular among some politically connected university alumni, veteran and 
fraternal groups. "153 . 
At around the same time as the Maryland controversy, SCV also 
applied for a specialty plate in North Carolina. There, the Division of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) initially refused the SCV' s application after 
determining that it was not a "civic club" within the meaning of the 
legislature's authorization. 1s4 The SCV filed suit in state court, where the 
trial judge held that the SCV met the statutory criteria and directed the 
DMV to issue the plates.1ss The appellate court affirmed, on state statutory 
grounds. 156 It reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees to the SCV, 
however, noting that DMV's positions were not "mere excuses for 
arbitrary behavior."157 As to the state's authority to deny the SCV a 
specialty plate on other grounds, the court noted, "Whether the display of 
the Confederate flag on state-issued license plates represents sound public 
policy is not an issue presented to this Court in this case. That is an issue 
for our General Assembly."158 It cautioned,.however, that "allowing some 
organizations which fall within [the statutory] criteria to obtain 
personalized plates while disallowing others equally within the criteria 
could implicate the First Amendment's restriction against content-based 
restraints on free speech."1s9 
SCV specialty plates, including the Confederate flag logo, are also 
available in a number of other states, including Alabama and Georgia.160 
In South Carolina, the SCV was the first to qualify for a specialty plate 
under a new procedure,· which moved the application decisions from the 
If:: . 
151. MVA Won't Challenge, supra note 130, at 2B. 
152. Id. 
153. Marina Sarris, Ruling Allowing Confederate Plates Won't Be Clralknged, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Mar. 28, 1997, at 11. 
154. N.C. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner, 509 S.B~2d 207,209 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1998) ("The Commissioner reached this decision after comparing the purposes and activities 
of SCV with 'the statutoty language and examples of qualifying civic ()rganizations. "'). 
155. ld. 
156. /d. at 211 C'[A]s SCV·NCD meets the four criteria enumerated by our General 
Assembly, ..• SCV-NCD qualifies for special registration plates."). · 
157. ld. at 212. 
1 58. /d. at 209 n.l. 
159. /d. 
160. SCV South Carolina, supra note 17, at 82. -' 
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legislature to the Department of Public Safety.161 The new law allows any 
nonprofit group to create specialty plates by submitting a $4,000 fee or 400 
prepaid applications. 162 · 
Other states have refused to approve the SCV plates, or have apcroved 
them without the flag logo. 163 In two of these states, Virginia 64 and 
Tennessee, 165 the SCV has responded with federal litigation. The SCV 
applied for a specialty plate in Virginia in 1998. The bill was held over 
until the next legislative session, and the SCV spent this time lobbying 
legislators. 166 When the House Transportation Committee considered the 
measure, over 100 SCV members attended. The committee heard 
testimony from the SCV's state commander, as well as several African-
Americans who told of their pride in the Confederate cause of "states' 
rights and tariffs" and its flag symbol.167 It then approved the SCV plate 
bill by a 21-2 vote. 168 The one African-American legislator who voted in 
favor of the bill, Del. William P. Robinson, the committee's chair and 
longtime leader of the As8embly' s Black Caucus, 169 explained that he 
"feared the state might be sued for discrimination if the request was 
denied" and the General Assembly could not "be saddled with a 
lawsuit." 170 
The transportation committee then sent the bill to the House of 
Delegates. Before the vote, however, Robinson called for and conducted 
an "unprecedented"171 additional hearing before the Transportation 
Committee "to give the public a chance to speak at a forum during the 
161. /d. 
162. /d. 
163. Todd Jackson, Confederate Group to Sue State Ove~ Ucense Plate Design, ROANOKE 
TIMES, May 6, 1999, at B1. 
164. /d. 
165. Lawrence Buser, Confetkmte Sons Defend Position on Car Tags in Lawsuit Against 
Tenn., COM. APPEAL. Sept. 18, 1999, at A12. 
166. Pamela Stallsmith, Plates Would Honor Confetkmte Veterans: Issue to be Among First 
to Face 1999 Session of General Assembly, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. S, 1999, at B 1. 
167. Unda McNatt, "Sons" Say Flag a Sign of Pride, Not Prejudice; Cotafetkrate Groups 
Want Rebel Flag to Fly Again-On License Plates, VIRGINIAN-PILar, Jan. 18, 1999, atBl; Pamela 
Stallsmith, Black Rebels • Kin Plead for SpeciDlty Plate: Some Find Flag RaciDlly Offensive, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 1999, at All. 
168. Todd Jackson, Group Hoists Rebel Flag in New Fighl; Civil Rights Disputes Drive 
Debate About license Plates, ROANOKE TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1999, at At. 
169. Two other African-American committee members were absent at the time of the vote. 
Donald P. Baker, Confederate Plate Effort Enlists Two Black Men, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1999, at 
B 1. Del. William P. Robinson, who voted for the bill in committee, later explained that he voted 
for it "at that time," and indicated that he was not prepared to say how be would vote in the General 
Assembly. Jd. 
170. Jackson, supra note 168, at A 1. 
171. Stallsmith, supra note 167, at A12. 
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legislative session that would attract more media attention. "172 Again, SCV 
members predominated in· the audience, and the same African-American 
spokespersons supported the bill. 173 The state's NAACP director testified 
against it, arguing that the flag "represents intimidation, terror, lynching 
and has ·been [appropriated] by hate groups and white supremacy 
groups."t74 . 
The House of Delegates, too, heard testimony in favor of and opposed 
to the SCV' s license plate application. It was the "spellbinding speech" of 
Del. Jerrauld C. Jones, head of the state's Legislative Black Caucus, that 
"compelled" a legislative compromise approving the plate but without the 
flag logo. 175 He told of riding the bus as a six-year-old past a Ku Klux Klan 
mlly, where he saw the Confederate flag wavin" next to a burning cross. 
"You could smell the fear on this bus," he said. 76 
The SCV enlisted the aid of the Rutherford Institute to sue the state, 
demanding that it issue the plate with the flag logo.177 During the 
legislative process, the SCV had rejected the compromise suggestion that 
the group use an alternate Confederate symbol such as the Great Seal or 
the first Confederate flag. 178 To give up its trademarked symbol, the group 
argued, would be "admitting it was racist or something to be ashamed of 
and we're not going to do that."179 Instead, the plates would provide "an 
opportunity to re...educate others about the flag's heritage and history," as 
well as "an opportunity to polish the image of the[] beloved flag, tarnished 
by misunderstanding. "180 Similarly, when the legislature approved the plate 
without the logo, SCV members refused· to buy it. ''Why would we want 
a tag without our logo?" the head of the Virginia SCV asked.181 "A tag 
without that logo is just a plain tag."182 · 
In its lawsuit, the SCV contended, as it did in Maryland, that Virginia's 
specialty plate program is a public forum for private speech, in which the 
government cannot censor an application simply because members of the 
172. Baker, supra note 169, at Bl. 
173. /d. 
174. Stallsmith, supra note 167, at A12. 
175. Holly A. Heyser & Mike Knepler, Jones Expected to RIUI/or Lieutenant Governor, 
VIRGJNIAN·PILOT, Aug. 8, 2000, at A16. 
176. /d. 
177. Todd Jackson, Confederate Group to Sue Over Ucen.re Plate Design: They Want to 
Include Battle Flog of Army of Northern Virginia, ROANOKE TIMES, May 6, 1999, at 81. 
178. Stallsmith, supra note 166, at B 1. 
179. /d. 
180. MeN~ supra note 167, at B 1. 
181. Rex Bowman, State Asking Judge to Dismiss Rebel Flog Suit, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 1999, at BS. 
182. Bowman, supra note 19, at BS. 
FLORIDA L4 W REVIEW (Vol 53 
public fmd it offensive. 183 The state countered that the specialty plate 
program &&does not ·create an ·automatic entitlement" to a plate.184 Rather, 
what appears on license plates is a '·~form of 'government speech,' that the 
state can control."185 The district court ruled in favor of the SCV, finding 
specialty plates to be private speech and denial of the Confederate flag 
logo to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination.186 
Around the time of the Virginia application, the SCV also applied for 
a specialty ~late in Tennessee. There; the state Senate voted 28-2 to 
approve it.1 The two "no" votes came from Sen. Steve Cohen, who 
commented that, "(i]t's insensitive to African-Americans," and Sen. 
Thelma H~r, the only African-American senator who voted on the 
measure.188 After Senate approval, the bill moved to the House. 189 1n that 
body, the Calendar Committee killed ·it, after several African-American 
legislators objected to the Confederate flag appearing on state license 
plates.190 
The SCV again filed a federal lawsuit, making the same arguments as 
it did in Virginia.191 Like the Virginia legislature, the Tennessee legislature 
has ~roved applications from a wide range of organizations for specialty 
plates. 92 Any gtoup with at least 500 members willing to purchase the 
plates can petition the legislature for specialty plate approval.193 Based 
upon ·the apparently open application and approval process, 194 the SCV 
argued that state officials have "unlawfully drawn distinctions" in failing 
to approve the group's specialty plate application.195 
183. Rex Bowman, Group Urges Fast Action on Plate: Asks Judge to Skip Trial, Order DMV 
to Make Flag Tags, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. S, 2000, at B8. 
184. Bowman, supra note 181, at B5. 
185. Bowman, supra note 183, at B8. 
186. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CVOOS30, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 538, at •S-21 (W.D. Va. Jan. 18, 2001); Craig Timberg, Virginia Loses Suit on license 
Plates; Conunemorative Tags to Portray Confederate Logo, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,2001, at Bl. 
181. de Ia Cruz, supra note 140, at 1 A. 
188. I d. ("'You know the kinds of attitudes those have proclaimed and the kinds of attitudes 
they've expressed toward certain groups, • Harper said. 'It was better to. vOte "no.''m). 
189. Tom Humphrey, Sundquist Assails "Neanderthal Thinking"; Says Reform Opposition 
May Lose Seais~ 'KNOXVIU.ENEWS~SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1999, at A3. 
190. Id. . 
191. Buser, supra note 165, at A12. 
192. Id. 
193. ld. 
194. Commini, supra note 20, at B2. ("(A]s far as he knows, the Sons of Confederate Veterans 
plate was the only specialty plate that has not been approved by the legislature.'') (quoting Rep. 
Steve McDaniel, sponsor of the SCV plate application). 
195. Buser, supra note 165, at A12. 
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In addition to specialty plates for organizations, the Tennessee 
legislature approves and makes available cause-related plates· as well.196 
The legislature is now consideringa bill to create an "I have a dream" plate 
with the quote and an image of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.197 Profits from . 
the plates would be earmarked for· the National Civil Rights Museum, 
fonnerly the Lorraine Motel, in Memphis, where King was slain in 1968.198 
The bill's s~nsor is Sen. Steve Cohen, 199 who voted against the SCV 
application. "The license plates will allow .Tennesseans to show their 
support of the positive and uplifting ideals Dr. King expressed and will 
provide a voluntary means of funding educational programs," Cohen 
explained. 201 
ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CATEGORIBS 
A Government Speech and the Democratic Process 
The Constitution permits the government to "speak for itself."202 
Governments indeed do so in many ways. 203 Government officials speak, 
government agencies inform and advise, government commissions publish 
reports, and legislatures hold hearings and enact and defend legislation that 
embodies particular public policies. These types of government speech are. 
necessarily "selective" among a range of viewpoints on controversial 
issues of public concern--they identify and advocate the "government's 
position" without giving equal time or access to competing points of 
view.204 · 




200. de Ia Cruz, supra note 140, at I A. 
201. Commins, supra note 20, at B2. 
202. Bd. ofRegentsofUniv. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,229 (2000) (indicating 
that ''the government can speak for itself," and when it does so, the constitutionality of its actiol'l 
is "evaluated on [that] premi~" rather than on the premise that it is regulating private speech). Se• 
generally MARK 0. Yuoof:, WHEN GoVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Steven Shiffrin, Gove~nt 
Speech, 27 UCLA L REV. 56S (1980). . 
203. See, e.g., YUDOP, supra note 202, at 13 ('-rile modes and types of gOvernment discourse 
include . . . direct access to the broadcast media, mass distribution of documents, speeches and other 
activities of political leaden reported in the private media, the gathering and dissemination of 
statistics and research results, advertising, preparation and dissemination of official reports, 
activities of government public=-relations offices, dissemination of official records of government 
proceedings, press conferences, public schooling, military training, and so on."). 
204. See David Cole. Beyond Unconslillllional Condltiou: Chatting SpMra of Nerurality in 
Govemment·Funded Spe•ch, 67 N.Y.U. L REv. 675, 681 (1992) ( .. [N]on-neutral government 
support of speech is often necessary in running a democratic government''), 
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Through these expressions, the government often seeks not only to 
inform, but also to persuade listeners to adopt the government's position. 205 
Sometimes the government directs these efforts outside of .its boundaries 
to pursue presumably shared interests of its constituents. The National 
Endowment for Democracy, established by Congress to encoura~; other 
countries to adopt democratic principles, is such an example. More 
often, however, the government directs such efforts towards its own 
citizens, attempting to convince them to eat or avoid certain foods, '11!' to get 
vaccinated,208 to stop smoking,209 or to "Just Say No" to drugs.210 
The government's authority to speak, whether to inform, educate or 
persuade, stems from the political process. The government may speak to 
"promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea" because "it is, 
in the end, accountable to the electorate via the political process for its 
advocacy."211 Not only does the political system established in the 
Constitution justify government speech, it arguably demands it. H 
governments are· to perform the many varied functions that they now 
perform, they simply must be able to communicate. 212 Because the process 
of governing involves constant decisionmaking on controversial public 
issues, governments' communications will relate to these topics. 
That a particular issue is subject to current, heated, public debate does 
not disqualify the government from "taking sides." Specifically, the 
government can, through the political processes, decide to favor childbirth 
20S. See, e.g., YUOOF, supra note 202, at 14 ("[T]here are a variety of ways government may 
attempt to influence behavior in accordance with its legitimate authority."). 
206. See Rust v. Sullivan, SOO U.S. 173. 194 (i991) (noting that, when Congress established 
the Endowment, "'it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing 
lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism"). 
207. See Rosie Mestel, The Food Pyramid: Does It Miss the Point?, L.A. TIMES, Sept 1, 2000, 
at AI (explaining that the government published "'first dietary guidelines" in 1980, ""which are the 
basis for government nutrition and education programs today"). 
208. See David G. Savage, Measles Epidemic Quelled, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
1992, at A22 (explaining that vaccination campaign reduced incidence of measles). 
209. Seelan1iontz, Teens TacldeSmoldngAmong Peers, PAIMBBACHPosT, Mar. 29,1998, 
at .JIB ('"About 600 students from across the state will design an advertising campaign to stop 
children from smoking. Money from Florida's S 11.3 billion tobacco settlement will pay for the 
program.''). 
210. See Jennings Parrott, First Family Stresses Three Little Words: Just Say No, L.A. TIMES, 
May 21,1986, at 1-2 ( .. During a White House Ceremony after Congress proclaimed "Just Say No 
Week,' [President] Reapn praised the F'mt Lady'' for .. her campaign for young people to "just say 
no' to drugs."). 
211. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 23S (2000). 
212. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 202, at 606 ( .. If government is to secure cooperation in 
implementing its programs, if it is to be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about their 
needs and the extent to which government can or s~ld meet those needs, government nust be 
able to communicate."). 
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over abortion. 213 It can then, through its own speech, attemEt to persuade 
pregnant women tochoQse the government-favored option. 2 4 Presumably, 
a government can decide to advocate the opposite view as well. Similarly, 
the government can decide either to use or not to use a particular symbol, 
and can consider, in making its decision, whether members of the public 
perceive the symbol to be "offensive" or "racist." The controversy over the 
use of the Confederate flag by several southern state governments 
illustrates this process. On the one hand, the Constitution does not forbid 
a government from choosing to fly the flag over its capitol.21s On the other 
hand, neither does it invalidate a government's decision to remove the flag 
because many citizens object to its apparent meaning.216 With respect to 
both of these controversies, the principle of political accountability allows 
the government to choose and advocate a particular viewpoint. 
B. Private Speech Forums a~ Minority Speech Protections 
The First Amendment's guarantee of "freedom of speech,217 protects 
private speakers from government actions that suppress their points of 
view.218 The core value protected by the free speech guarantee is ''the free 
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. "~19 
Free private speech is central to the legitimacy of democratic government, 
which rests on the faith that citizens choose the rulers, and thus the rules, 
that structure their actions.220 The prime threat to this value offree private 
speech is a powerful government that acts as a censor, distorting the 
content of public debate.221 From these tenets comes the core free speech 
213. Casey v. Planned Parenthood ofS.B. Pa., 505 U.S. 833,872 (1992). 
214. ld. at 883 (stating that government can require physicians to inform pregnant women of 
government-produced literature that provides information about fetal development, but which 
requirement is for the purpose of persuading women to choose childbirth over abortion). 
215. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561-62 (lith Cir. 1990). 
216. Cf. Georgia SeMtt. Approves Bill for New Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, A 12 (noting 
that Georgia approved new flag that minimizes Confederate flag, which will fly on Feb. 1 ). 
217. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law •.. abridging freedom of speech."). 
218. The free speech guarantee applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (192S). · 
219. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988). 
220. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YAI.B L.J. 151, 153 (1996) ("A 
democratic government derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is considered responsive to its 
citizens .•.. We would rightly regard a government that treated its citizens as mere instrumentalities 
of the state>-•ctosed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to communicate,' -as 
totalitarian rather than democratic.'') (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Disl, 393 
u.s. 503, 5 ll (1969)). 
221. See. e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 ( 1978) ( .. Especially 
where .•. the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable 
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly 
offended."). 
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clause principle that the government may not selectively regulate private 
speech "based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying 
message. "222 It must instead tolerate "offensive" private speech223 and 
cannot favor particular types of speech that it determines to be in the public 
interest. 224 
These protections against discriminatory regulation of private speech 
outside the governmental domain extend also to instances in which the 
government uses its property or resources to create a speech "forum."225 
"Forum doctrine"226 stems from the concept of the traditional public forum, 
which includes government property such as streets, 227 parks,228 and 
sidewalks, 229 which have "by long tradition or by government fiat" been 
"devoted to assembly and debate."230 Despite government ownership, the 
objective characteristics of this propertf31-and thus its importance to the 
Constitution's commitment to freeexRression232-"require the government 
to accommodate private speakers. "23 This required accommodation means 
that, absent a compelling purpose, the government cannot discriminate 
222. R.A.V. v. Oty of St. Paul, SOS U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
223. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989) ('1fthere is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 74S-46 (1978) ("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a 
sufficient reason for suppressing it."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. S76, S92 (1969) ("It is firmly 
settled that ..• the public expression of ideas may. not be prohibited merely because the ideas are 
themselves offensive to some of their hearers."). 
224. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[U]nder the Equal 
Protection Oause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use 
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less 
favored or more controversial views!'). 
22S. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, SOS U.S. 672, 679 (1992) 
(using a "'forum based' approach" to "[assess] restrictions that the government seeks to place on 
the use of its property''). 
226. See id. at 678 (employing a "'forum based' approach"). 
227. See id. (noting that "streets and parks" are traditional public forums) (quoting Hague v. 
Comm'n for Indus Org., 307 U.S. 496, SIS (1939)); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474,481 (1988) 
(holding residential street to be public forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n 11. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 
460 U.S. 37, 4S (1983) (listing "streets and parks'' as examples of traditional public forums). 
228. PerryEduc.A.ss'n,460U.S.at4S;Capito1SquareReview&AdvisoryBd. v. Pinette, SIS 
U.S. 753, 761 (199S) (park area surrounding state capitol building). 
229. See Boos v. Barry, 48S U.S. 312,318 (1988) (sidewalk outside embassy); United States 
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (sidewalk outside Supreme Court building). 
230. Perry Educ. A.ss'n, 460 U.S. at 4S. 
231. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, S23 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) ('7raditional public 
fora are defined by the objective characteristics of the property."). 
232. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNST11U110NAL LAW § 12·24 (2d ed. 1988) ("The 
designation 'public forum' serves as shorthand for the recognition that a particular context 
represents an important channel of communication in the system of free expression."). 
233. Forbes, S23 U.S. at 678. 
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among speakers seeking access according to the content of their 
messages. 234 
Beyond traditional public forums, which exist regardless of government 
intent,235 the government can, by granting access to private speakers, 
transfonn its property into speech forums.236 Although the government is 
not required to provide such access or financial aid to private speakers, 
when it chooses to do so the "forum" principles limit its discretion to pick 
and choose among speakers. The government retains the most discretion 
to choose among speakers in nonpublic forums.237 In such forums it does 
not grant "general access," but rather "does no more than reserve eligibility 
' 
234. See, e.g., id. at 677 ("The government can exclude a speaker from a traditional public 
forum 'only when the excl~sion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion 
is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.'") (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Deg. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 
(1992) ("[R]egulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for 
public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny."). 
235. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678 ("[11raditional public fora are open for expressive activity 
regardless of the government's intent.")~ · 
236. ld. (stating that the government creates a speech forum when it makes access to 
government property or funding available "to a certain class of speakers"). 
237. Beyond the traditional public forum, the Court has identified two other types of forums: 
"[T]he public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." ld. at 677 
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). The Court distinguishes the two by whether the government 
grants "general" or "selective" access to private speakers.!d. at 679. Where the government "makes 
its property generally available to a certain class of speakers," it creates a designated public forum. 
ld. When the government then "excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated 
public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 677. By 
contrast, when the government grants "selective access" to its property, it creates a nonpublic 
forum. ld. at 679. In a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of a speaker "must not be based on the 
speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property." /d. 
at 682. Although these rules appear different, they are really the same. The Court· has held that the 
government may "limit" a designated public forum according to criteria that are not viewpoint-
based. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n. 7 (1983). So, the 
only real constraint on the government's ability to "designate" a "forum" is the same that applies 
when it grants access to a nonpublic forum-it cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination. Justice 
Blackmun recognized this early on. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
More recently, the Court has implicitly recognized this lack of distinction. See Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (characterizing funding mechanism 
as a limited public forum, but applying rules of the nonpublic forum-exclusions must be 
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and may not discriminate against speech 
on the basis of its viewpoint) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). Lower courts have done so 
explicitly. See Gentala v. City of Tuscan, 213 F. 3d 1055, 1062 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he 
distinction between a limited public forum and a nonpublic forum is a semantic distinction without 
an analytic difference."); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 196 F.3d 958, 965 
(9th Cir. 1999) (characterizing the Supreme Court' s tenninology as "us[ing] the term 'limited 
public forum' to refer to a type of nonpublic forum"); Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 194 
n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun' s observation in Cornelius that the 
"limited public forum [is] analytically indistinct from a nonpublic forum"). 
·' 
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for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members 
must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it."238 Still, forum 
doctrine limits the grounds for permission decisions in such nonpublic 
forums.239 The government can be "selective" according to a speaker's 
topic or status.240 It cannot;· however, discriminate among speakers for the 
purpose of favoring or suppressing a particular point of view .241 
This prohibition on government viewpoint discrimination is so strong 
that it exists even in circumstances where the government aids private 
speakers in a context that may not be a forum at all.242 According to the· 
Court, "even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'ai[m] 
at the suppression of dangerous ideas. "'243 Thus, in the context of a "highly 
selective grant program,"244 in which "absolute neutrality is simply 
'inconceivable, '"245 the Constitution would likely still forbid the 
government "to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of 
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints."246 
C. Specialty Plate Programs and the Problem of Placement 
Specialty plate programs do not fit well within either the "government 
speech" or "private speech forum" categories, both because of the 
differences among programs and the different aspects within particular 
programs. As to the differences among programs, it is first necessary to 
238. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679. 
239. See id. at 682 ("[N]onpublic forum status 'does not mean that the government can restrict 
speech in whatever way it likes . ..,,) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
240. See, e.g., id. at 682 (holding that government may exclude candidate from debate 
"because he had generated no appreciable public interest"); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("The 
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may 
justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics!'); Perry 
Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49 (holding that exclusion of speaker "based on status" is permissible). 
241. See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682. "The government can restrict access to a nonpublic 
forum 'as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression 
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.'" /d. at 677-78 (quoting Cornelius, 473 
u.s. at 800). 
242. /d. at 677 (stating that, beyond traditional and designated public forums, "[o ]ther 
government properties are either nonpublic fora or not fora at·all"). 
243. Nat') Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v. 
Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).· 
244. /d. at 585 ("[l)t would be 'impossible to have a highly selective grant program without 
denying money to a large amount of constitutionally protected expression."') (quoting Finley v. 
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd 524 U.S. 569 (1998) 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)). 
245. /d. at 585-86 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795.,96 (1st Cir. 
1976)). 
246. /d. at 587 (stating that if the National Endowment for Arts were to do this, "then we 
would confront a different case"). 
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distinguish programs under which the legislature approves applications 
from those under which an administrative agency makes the decisions. It 
is the former that are at issue in the current specialty plate challenges. The 
latter was at issue in the one decision that has become final. 247 
The less common situation-where a state agency approves specialty 
plate applications pursuant to legislative guidelines-is the easier one to 
classify under the existing framework. In such a program, the legislature, 
by establishing the program and setting out guidelines for applications, 
evin~s an intent to open a particular piece of government property for 
private speech. 248 The program created is thus properly classified as a 
forum. 249 Because the area available on a license plate has certainly not 
traditionally been available for private speech, ·the program creates a 
nonpublic forum.250 Under the existing framework, the question then 
becomes whether the access rules-both those mandated by the legislature 
and those imposed bt the agency-are reasonable in light of the forum and 
viewpoint neutral.25 
The more common situation-where the legislature establishes a 
specialty license plate program and retains for itself the discretion to 
approve particular applications-is harder to classify. On the one hand, 
application criteria are typically undefined by subject matter or viewpoint 
and invite the participation of private speakers. These features suggest that 
the legislature has created a private speech forum. On the other hand, the 
current controversies illustrate quite clearly that legislative approval of 
particular applications depends not only on meeting the ministerial 
application requirements, but also on presenting a message that the 
legislature deems substantively appropriate. This substantive review, 
pursuant to which the legislators act as lerslators, "pushing'' particular 
applications quickly through the process25 while "killing" others253 and 
247. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md. 
1997). 
248. See id. (noting that statute allows Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration to issue 
specialty plates to "qualifying'' non-profit organizations, and that these qualifications include that 
at least twenty-five members of the organization agree to pay the extra fee for the plates). 
249. /d. at 1102-03 (assuming that the specialty license plate program is a forum, but not 
deciding which type because the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination applies to them all). 
250. See supra note 237 (noting that there is no analytical difference between a limited and 
a nonpublic forum). 
251. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1102 (•"[C]ontrol over .•. a nonpublic forum [must be] 
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and viewpoint neutral. ''1 (quoting Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,806 (1985)). 
252. See. e.g., Belkin. supra note 98. at A 1 S (noting that executive vice president of Indiana's 
Right To Life organization said, after .. Choose Ufe" plate bill stalled. that '"he would attempt to 
push the bill through again"). 
253. ld. (•1n Indiana, the [Choose Ufe] plate was attached to a bill approving veterans of 
foreign wars plates but was killed when plates supporting the AfL.CIO and United Auto Workers 
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openly relying on majority preferences for approving or rejecting particular 
applications, suggests that the government is doing more than neutrally 
managing a private speech forum. The degree of government involvement 
in the selection process suggests that the government itself is talking. 
In addition to the objective features of the specialty plate programs, 
government officials' explanations and arguments in defense of the 
programs evidence confusion as to whether the programs constitute private 
· or public expression. According to one Louisiana legislator~~ the "Choose 
Life" specialty plate is "no different from a bumper sticker."254 The wide 
range of specialty plates available may indicate that the plate is not a "state 
endorsement of any certain viewpoint."2S' While the assistant state attorney 
general, arguing on behalf of the state in the legal challenge, agreed that 
the availability of bumper stickers was relevant to the constitutional 
inquiry, his point was that such "alternative methods" for private speakers 
to express their views meant that the specialty plate program did not create 
a "forum for private speech. "2S6 
In Florida, Governor Lawton Chiles vetoed the "~boose Life" plate bill 
when it was ftrst passed, stating that "[ s ]imply because a particular 
message is able to garner a majority of votes in the Florida Legislature" 
does not mean that it should appear on "an official State of Florida license 
plate. "2S7 When the bill was later passed again and signed into law by 
Governor Jeb Bush, the state argued that the ~late was appropriate 
specifically because its sponsors "had the votes." 8 In Virginia, the one 
black legislator who voted in favor of the Confederate flag plates in 
committee explained that his vote was based on his fear that "the state 
might be sued for discrimination if the request was denied. "2S9 Another 
black legislator, however, through a "spellbinding speech about racism," 
successfu]g convinced the House of Delegates to excise the flag logo from 
the plate. 
The characterization of the specialty plate programs by different states 
and judges has varied, too. Florida successfully convinced a federal district 
were added to the bill, said Roger Tennyson, the executive vice president of Indiana's Right To Ufe 
organization.''); Humphrey, supm note t89, at A3 (stating that Tenne$See Confederate flag plate 
bill"was killed in the House Calendar Committee after several black legislators objected to the idea 
()f the state sanctioning a plate featuring a Confederate flag"). 
254. Ritea. supra note t06, at At (comment of Rep. Melinda Scbwegmann). 
255. I d. ("Louisiana has t 04 specialty plates-labeled with everything from ~Preserve the Wild 
Turkey' to 'Louisiana State University."'). 
2S6. Gyan, supra note lt5, at 18. 
2S1. ACW Press Release, supra note 64. 
258. TaiJcback Live, supra note 65 (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education 
Commissioner). 
259. Jackson, supra note 168, at At. 
260. Heyser & Knep1er, supra note 175, at A16. 
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court judge to ~ismiss the plaintiffs' challenge as not ripe, based on 
plaintiffs' failure to apply for a pro-choice license plate.261 The court also 
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the bill creating the 
"Choose Life" plate because the wide variety of specialty plates available 
means that "in no way does [the "Choose Life" plate] prevent anyone's 
speech ... 262 Boih of these reasons implicitly characterize Florida's specialty 
plate program as a forum. By contrast, in Virginia the state argued that the 
specialty plate program does not create a forum, but is a form of 
government speech. 263 The court, however, characterized the specialty 
plate program as a forum. 264 In Louisiana, the federal district court 
accepted the state's argument that the "Choose Life" plate "articulat[ es] a 
viewpoint legislatively chosen and embraced by the State,"265 but used that 
finding to detennine that '"the State fails in its responsibility to provide a 
viewpoint-neutrai forum .. "266 
IV. LEGISLATION AND THE LIMITS OF "SELECfiVITY" AMONG 
Pluv ATE SPEAKERS 
The crucial question that the distinction between government speech 
and private speech forums addresses is the degree of selectivity that the 
government can exercise when granting aid, in the fonn of property access 
or funding, to private speakers. Specifically, a government can 
discriminate according to viewpoint in its own speech, whereas it cannot 
do so when it chooses among private speakers. Because the distinctions 
drawn in the approval process are either openlyl67 or very likely viewpoint-
based, 268 characterization of the programs is crucial to their 
constitutionality. 
261. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, J999U.S. Dist. LBXIS 22503,at *14-20 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). . 
262. ld. at *20. 
263. Bowman, supra note 183, at B8. 
264. SCV v. Holcomb, No. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 538, at *23. 
265. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 596 (B.D. La. 2000). 
266. I d. at 599. 
267. Government decision makers acknowledge that they denied license plate access to the 
Confederate flag logo because of its "hostile and racially derogatory" message. Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Md. 1997). Message-based 
discrimination is viewpoint discrimination. See R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 
(1992). 
268. It is less clear why the "Clloose Ufe" plates were approved than why the Confederate flag 
plates were denied. In Louisiana, the government argued that it apprOves of the message. 
Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 595. In Florida, challengers argued that an attempt to get an 
alternative message on a plate would be "fruitless!' Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV -1·21-A, 
1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22503, at *17 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). The legislative process at least 
leaves wide discretion for viewpoint discrimination to operate. 
·' 
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The specialty license plate programs at issue present both sides of this 
selectivity question. One,claim is that specialty license plate programs are 
forms of government sPeech. In this case, the government would have 
broad discretion to be selective among private applicants. Obviously, it is 
advantageous for a government that wants to be selective to claim private 
speech as its own. The question is whether and when the Constitution 
limits the government's ability to do this. 
If government cannot effectively claim the protections of government 
speech for specialty plate programs, then they are private speech forums. 
In such forums, limits on the government's selectivity apply. The question 
then is whether the existing programs located in the legislature do,-or can, 
meet the Constitution's viewpoint neutrality requirement. 
A. Specialty License Plate Programs as "Not a Forum at All" 
Not all government property on which private speakers can speak 
constitutes a forum. Some government aid, in the fonn of access or 
funding, does not constitute a "for[ urn] · at all. "269 Where the government 
does not create a forum, it can be more selective in choosing the recipients 
of its largesse.270 In a number of recent cases, the Supreme Court has 
upheld government selectivity among private speakers beyond the 
boundaries of the forum restrictions. 271 It is thus necessary to detennine the 
boundaries of these categories where greater selectivity is permissible and 
to determine whether the specialty plate programs at issue fit within them. 
1. Government Agents 
To the extent that "government" can speak, it must be able to speak 
through agents.272 Government officials are government agents,273 as are 
government bodies. 274 Beyond government employees and entities, the 
269. Ark. Bduc. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,677 (1998). 
270. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587·88 (1998) ("[T]he 
Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impennissib1e 
were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at ~e.''). 
271. Finley,' 524 U.S. at 587·88 ("(T]he Government may allocate co~tive funding 
according to criteria that would be impennissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal 
penalty at stake.''); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (stating that government may 
"selectively fund" speech of government agents); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (noting that 
government's exercise of'~editorial discretion" is not subject to restrictions of forum doctrine). 
272. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 204, at 702 ("Because 'government' as such cannot speak; the 
only way it can express its views is by paying human beings to do so.j. 
273. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (u[B]Iected 
officials ... espouse [the government's] position.''). 
274. Rosenbergerv. Rector& Visitors ofUniv. ofVa.,515U.S. 819,833 (1995)(statingthat 
when "the University is speaking," it has the discretion of the government to .. make content·based 
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government may "[enlist] private entities to convey its own message."275 
Like ~'government" generally, these agents must be able to choose among 
viewpoints to explain and advocate the "government's" position. 276 
Because their speech is traceable to the government, its legitimacy depends 
upon the political accountability that supp<?rts government speech and 
justifies viewpoint discrimination within it.277 
The Supreme.Court condoned government control of its private agents' 
speech in Rust v. Sullivan. 278 That case involved a challenge to Department 
of Health and Human Services regulations ~plementing Title X of the 
Public Health Service Act.279 The Act authorized the Department to fund 
"preventive"280 family planning services, meaning that those where 
"abortion is a method of family planning" are excluded. 281 The 
Department's regulations prohibited Title X gantees from providing 
"counseling . . . or . . . referral for abortion" and from engaging in 
activities that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of 
family planning."283 Plaintiffs, Title X grantee organizations and doctors 
suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, argued that the 
regulations "impermissibly discriminat[ ed] based on viewpoint" by 
favoring private speakers who advocated childbirth over those who 
advocated abortion. 284 
The Court responded that Title X grantees were government af:ents 
during the time that they worked under the auspices of the project. 2 s As 
such, the government could appropriately f:ohibit them "from engaging in 
activities outside of the project's scope. "2 Such a prohibition was "not a 
choices"). 
275. ld. 
276. ld. (''When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a 
governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is 
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee."). 
277. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("When the government speaks [as an organizational body 
or through its agents], for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, 
in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy."). 
278. 500 u.s. 173, 203 (1991). 
279. ld. at 178. 
280. ld. at 178-79 (stating that abortion exclusion '"was intended to ensure that Tide X funds 
would 'be used only to support preventive family planning services, population research, infertility 
semces, and other related medical, infonnational, and educational activities,.') (quotina H.R. CoNP. 
REP. No. 91-1667. at 8 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068, 5081-82). 
281. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1991)). 
282. ld. (citing 42 C.P.R.§ 59.8(a)(l) (1989)). 
283. ld, at 180 (citing 42 C.P.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)). 
284. ld. at 194. 
285. ld. at 198. •' 
286. ld. at 194. 
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case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea, "'287 but rather was 
akin to its funding a National Endowment for Democracy, which Congress 
could constitutionally require to promote one political philosophy over 
others.288 
Not everyone aided by the government to speak, however, is a 
government agent. The public forum cases, 289 and particularly the 
extension of the public forum doctrine into "funding forums,"290 confmn 
this. The mere fact that the government provides property access or 
financial assistance to private speakers is not enough to justify government 
viewpoint discrimination among them~ 291 It is thus necessary to identify 
what additional factors make a private speaker a government agent. 
Because political accountability is what justifies viewpoint 
discrimina~on by government agents, it ·is crucial that the government 
acknowledge a government agent's speech as its own.292 Whether the 
acknowledgment in Rust was sufficient is questionable, given the common 
expectation by patients entering medical clinics that the speech of doctors 
in the clinics is not subject to government control.293 Nevertheless, the 
democratic pedigree and public visibility of the statut()ry directive, and the 
doctors' ability to make clear that their speech is government-controlled,294 
287. ld. 
288. /d. (citing 22 U.S.C.§4411(b) (1989)). 
289. Id. at 199-200 ("[11he existence of a Government 'subsidy,' in the form of Government-
owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in. [traditional public forums].''), 
790. Bd.ofRegentsofUniv.ofWis.Sys. v. Southworth,S29U.S.217,233-3S(2000)(''When 
a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracunicular speech of other students, 
all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others . .' .. Our decision 
ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its agents or employees, or-
of particular importance-its faculty, are subject to the Pirst Amendment analysis which controls 
in this case"); Rosenbergerv. Rector 8c. VisitorsofUniv. ofVa., SIS U.S. 819,841 (199S) (finding 
that school's adherence to a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its student fee program 
to fund student speech wauld preyent "any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak 
for the University"). 
291. Rust, SOO U.S. at 199-200 ('-ntis is not to suggest that funding by the Government. even 
when coupled. with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the 
Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify Oovemment control over the content 
of expression.',. · 
292. See Southworth, S29 U.S. at 229 ('~e University having disclaimed that the speech is 
its own, we do not reach the question whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible 
government action would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and to· allow the 
challenged program under the principle that the government can speak for itself.") . . 
293. See Post, supra note 220, at 174 8c. n.l28 (distinguishing situation in Rust "where 
physicians routinely exercise independent judgment, [and so] patients come to expect and rely upon 
that judgment" from alternate scenario of government-created "special clinics in which all 
concerned were clear that what appeared at first blush to be 'physicians' were actually merely state 
employees, fully subject to [government control of their speechr). 
294. Rust, SOO U.S. at 200 ("The doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding 
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are at least arguably sufficient for the government to claim funded doctors' 
speech as its own. _ 
But a mere claim by the government that particular private speech is its 
own cannot be enough. 295 The claim must be plausible in the context of the 
entire access or funding program. 296 The government's policy and practice 
of administering access to the subsidy is relevant, 297 as is the public's 
perception of the public or private nature of the expression. 298 Within a 
particular program, the government cannot pick and choose among 
speakers to call its agents.299 The claim must be uniform throughout the 
subsidy program.300 Moreov~r, a government agent must be pursuing a 
particular Jovernment policy identified within the scope of the authorized 
program. 1 Although the government policy can be speech-related, so as 
to explain or promote particular behavior or values,302 it cannot be so 
broadly defined that it boils down to a policy to promote a range of private 
expression. A specialty license plate program is a government decision to 
create a private speech forum, not to promote speech by government 
agents. 303 · 
abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program!'). 
295. In the forum inquiry, the Court looks beyond the government's assertion of a right to 
choose among private speakers to detennine whether, given the characteristics of the forum, it in 
fact has the right to do so. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,682 
(1998) (stating that television commissioner did not have "unfettered power to exclude any 
candidate it wished"). . 
296. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(examining ''the lawful boundaries" to a funding program that the government "has itself set"). 
2fT/. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 ("The Court has looked to the policy and practice of the 
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly 
and debate as a public forum.'1 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &: Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, .802 (1985)); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. BayTransp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 
10 (1st Cir. 1994) ("mhe Court also has stated that the government's intent JDJst be gleaned from 
its policy and practice with respect to the property at issue.'1; see also Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. 
v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No.5, 941 F.2d45, 47 (1stCir.1991)(stating that, in forum designation 
inquiry, "actual practice speaks louder than words"). 
298. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (characterizing candidate debate as private speech forum in part 
because of "implicit representation of the broadcaster ... that the views expressed were those of 
the candidates [and] not its own,). 
299. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34 (finding that, when the government "create[s] a 
program to encourage private speech, •• it cannot "discriminate based on the viewpoint of the priv•e 
persons whose speech it facilitates''). 
300. See id. at 833 (noting that the government in Rust ''used private speakers to tra!Jsmit 
specific information pertaining to its own programs'1. 
301. ld. (''We recognized [in Rust] that when the government appropriates public funds to 
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. j. . 
302. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) ("[G]ovemment may 'make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and •. ~ implement that judgment by the allocation of 
public funds."1 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)). 
303. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (finding that candidate debate was a private speech forum 
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The factors noted above indicate that neither the groups that obtain the 
right to specialty plate recognition nor the individuals who purchase the 
plates are government agents. Specialty plate programs broadly invite 
applications from any group able to gather enough public support to 
suggest that the proposed plate would be profitable.304 The plates are 
generally understood by purchasers and viewers to be private speech. 305 
The inconsistent groups and messages on the plates in any particular state 
defy an attempt by state governments to claim all specialty plate speech as 
their own.306 Consequently, t~e only government policy that officials can 
claim to be pursuing is allowing private speakers with identities or 
messages consistent with public values to advertise those values with 
public assistance. 307 Such a broad designation of government policy is not 
~legitimate government agent designation. 
2. Government Editorial Judgments 
The government also avoids the viewpoint discrimination restrictions 
of forum doctrine when it exercises editorial discretion. Although the 
government action "involve[s] the compilation of the speech of third 
parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communicative acts."308 
Because the decisions of the governmental editors are themselves speech, 
claims of viewpoint- discrimination are inconsistent with their very 
nature.309 Specifically in the context of public broadcasters, "[t]o comply 
with their obligation to air programming that serves the public interest, 
broadcasters must often choose among speakers expressing different 
viewpoints."310 While some editors may abuse the power to discriminate 
because "[t]he very purpose of the debate was to allow the candidates to express their views with 
minimal intrusion by the broadcaster"). 
304. See, e.g., Tal/cback Live, supra note 65 ("[A] legislator has the right to put in a bill to 
have any kind of a tag they want as long as they get the signatures required and put up the deposit..,) 
(statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner). 
305. See, e.g., Ritea, supra note 106, at Al ("We have license plates that support animals, 
universities, Ducks Unlimited and ldon't know what all. ... It simply means if someone believes 
in a cause, they're willing to pay the money tor the license plates.") (quoting Rep. Melinda 
Schweg'mann). 
306. See, e.g., Talkback Live, supra note 65 ("Some people might think that the Florida State 
University tag and the University of Florida tag could be pretty political, because when they plat 
[sic] that game which they played a couple of weeks ago, it became pretty political . .,) (statement 
of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner). . 
307. Lee, supra note 48, at 15A ("[T]he Legislature has, by statute, given the citil:ens of 
Florida the right to petition the state for a license plate .... Additionally, the Senate has imposed 
nine policy questions to ensure that the license plate serves a broad public purwse!'). 
308. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674. 
309. Id. ("[A] broadcaster by its nature' will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints 
instead of others."). 
310. ld. 
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among viewpoints, "calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve 
higher values."311 Chief among these values is the exercise of the "widest 
journalistic freedom."312 A threat to this value is ''the risk of an 
enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast 
discussion of public issues," were equal access rules to apply.313 Making 
courts the arbiters of such equal access claims "could obstruct the 
legitimate purposes of television broadcasters," which is to determine "the 
treatment of public issues" and to remain uaccountable" for their 
choices.314 
Specialty license plate programs are not unified fovernment speech acts 
-such as a public broadcaster's programlning,31 a government entity's 
report or newsletter,316 or even a government-sponsored parade317-to 
which the protections of editorial discretion might appropriately apply. In 
each of these instances, rather than consisting "of individual, unrelated 
segments that happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by 
[private individuals]," each individual unit of communication "is 
understood to contribute something to 3: common theme."318 By contrast, 
legislators generally do not view themselves as "editors" when they 
approve the particular "mix" of specialty license plates available for 
purchase, 319 and members of the public, while perhaps objecting to a 
311. /d. (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat' I Comm., 412 U.S. 94p 125 (1973)). 
312. /d. 
313. CBS, 412 U.S. at 125. 
314. Forbes, S23 U.S. at 674-7S (citing CBS. 412 U.S. at 124). 
315. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, Sl2U.~~622. 636(1994)( .. Tbrough 'original programming 
or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, • 
cable programmers and operators 'seek to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and 
in a wide variety of fonnats. "')(quoting Oty of L.A. v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 
488. 494 (1986)). . 
316. Cf, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n. 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that 
newsletter whose "contents range from energy-saving tips to stories about wildlife conservation, 
and from billing information to recipes .•• receives the full protection of the F'trSt Amendment"). 
317. Cf. Hurley v.lrish·American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, SIS U.S. SS1, 
577 ( 1995) ("(l]n the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade, s overall 
message is distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit's expression is 
perceived by spectators as part of the whole!'). 
318. /d. at 576 (explaining why private parade cannot be forced to accept unwanted marching 
unit). 
319. Ritea, supra note 106. at At ("We have license plates that support animals, universities, 
Ducks Unlimited and I don't know what all. It simply means if someone believes in a cause. they're 
willing to pay the money for the license plates.") (quoting Rep. Melinda Schwegmann); TaUcbaclc 
Uve, supra note 65 ("[W)hen we did the Cabinet meeting the other day, we did (a specialty plate] 
for bicyclists. You have one for salt water fishennen. And so there's a variety, about 48 different 
organizations, including the Challenger, that basically are there to raise money for different 
organizations and different things.") (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Education 
Commissioner). · 
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particular plate's message, do not understand the compilation of plates 
approved to express an overall "message" or "theme."320 Rather, both 
legislators and the public generally understand specialty plate programs to 
make a range of plate messages available to private individuals who can 
choose whether to purchase one, display it, and thereby claim it as their 
own. Because specialty plates are primarily understood as separate acts of 
individual expression rather than as a combined whole of government 
expression, the "higher value" of protecting the government's editorial 
discretion to pick and choose among plate applicants does not exist in this 
context. 
3. Competitive Quality Judgments 
The constraints of forum doctrine do not apply with full force when the 
government aids private speakers ~ursuant to a program established to 
identify and promote "excellence." 21 This "inherently content-based ... 
threshold" distinguishes the program from those where the Government 
"indiscriminately 'encourage[s] a diversity of views from private 
speakers. '"322 In the latter, a court can require that access criteria be 
viewpoint-neutral, whereas in the former "absolute neutrality is simply 
'inconceivable.' "323 
The Supreme Court approved potentially viewpoint-based criteria in the 
context of a facial challenge to "highly selective" National Endowment for 
the Arts (NEA) funding.324 In National Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley,325 the Court found that, because the Government was acting as 
"patron" rather than as "sovereign,'' the free speech clause constraints on 
its discretion were less stringent.326 The Court emphasized that "[t]he 
NEA's mandate to make aesthetic judgments" set its task apart from that 
320. ACLU Press Release, supra note 64 (arguing that approval of "Choose Life" plate is 
inappropriate because it concerns "the most divisive public issue in our state today," and is "quite 
different from traditional specialty tags which . support projects such as universities, the 
environment, the arts, endangered species and education"). 
321. Nat') Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (finding that 
••excellence" threshold of National Endowment for the Arts "sets it apart" from noncompetitive 
subsidies). 
322. ld. (quotingRosenbergerv.Rector& VisitorsofUniv.ofVa.,515U.S. 819, 834(1995)). 
323. ld. at 585 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 
1976)). 
324. ld. 
325. 524 u.s. 569 (1998). 
326. /d. at 587-89 ("[A]lthough the First Amendment has application in the subsidy context, 
we note that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be 
impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake .... But when the 
Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision [of 
standards] are not constitutionally severe."). 
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of other government actors charged with making "comparatively objective 
decisions on allocating public benefits, such as access to a school 
auditorium or a municipal theater, or [to] the second class mailing 
privileges available to 'all newspapers and other periodical 
publications. '"327 · 
The question is how far the government's ability to make "quality" or 
"excellence'' -based judgments extends. In particular, the government's 
primary argument for selecting among specialty plate messages is that it 
has the right, and the obligation, to approve those plates that are consistent 
with public values. 328 This "quality" measure mirrors the standard 
approved in Finley. 329 Thus, its legitimacy depends upon whether specialty 
plate programs can 1;le characterized as the same sort of government-as-
patron program approved in Finley. 
Crucial to Finley's approval of such a quality judgments program is that 
it has boundaries. 330 These boundaries distinguish such a program from a 
private speech forum, where the rule against viewpoint discrimination 
applies with full force. 331 It is thus necessary to detennine what these 
boundaries are. That the government can discriminate more freely in 
administering a quality judgments program suggests that, as with 
government editorial judgments, "risks of abuse" are tolerated in order to 
serve "higher values. "332 In the context of gove~ent editorial judgments, 
the primary higher values served are addin~ the unique voice of the 
government editor to the marketplace of ideas, 33 and thereby augmenting 
. , · . ,. 
327. Id. at S86 (quoting Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,.327 U.S. 146, 148 n.l (1946)) (citations 
omitted). 
328. See, e.g.,Heyser&Knepler.supra note 175, at Al6 ('1Legislator's] spellbinding speech 
about racism compelled the House of Delegates to remove the Confederate flag from a proposed 
license plate.''): Lee. supra note 48, at 1 SA (stating that Senate's "nine policy questions •.. ensure 
that the license plate serves a broad public purpose" and protects against approval of plates that 
"advertise a negative fringe Idea"). 
329. Finley, 524 U.S. at 576 (noting that statute directs NBA to "tak[e1 into consideration 
general stand&(ds of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American pu~lic") 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. f 954(d)(l) (1965)) (alteration in original). 
330. The extent of the government's ability to engage in explicit viewpoint discrimination, 
even in a quality judgments program, is unclear after Finley. Although approving the "decency and 
respect•' criteria for aits funding, the COurt also mentioned as relevant to its decision that the 
challenge was facial, rather than as applied, id. at 580, that the criteria were ''bonatory" rather than 
mandatory, id., and that there was no evidence that the NBA would "leverage its power to award 
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints," id. at 581. 
331. See id. at 586 (distinguishing NBA quality judgments program fron1 the "limited public 
forum" created by a university when it decides to subsidize the speech of .. all student organizations 
that [are 1 'related to [its 1 educational purpose', (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. 
ofVa., SIS U.S. 819.824 (1995)). 
332. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666. 674 (1998) (quoting CBS v. 
Democratic Nat' I Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973)). 
333. See id. at 675 (stating that "exercise of joumali~c discretion" is "speech aCtivity .. with 
·' 
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rather than constricting the speech available for public consumption. 
Determining when these same values are served with respect to 
government quality judgments marks the boundaries of this type of forum. 
Government speech-alone or produced through interaction with 
private individuals or entities-is a free speech clause value when the 
prerequisites for legitimate government speech are met. The· primary 
prerequisite is government accountability for its role in shaping the speech 
that enters the marketplace of ideas. 334 Accountability comes most 
fundamentally from visibility. 335 In the context of a quality judgments 
program, this means that the government can claim the discretion that 
attaches to it only when it acknowledges responsibility for making quality 
judgments. 336 A related requirement of accountability is the consistency of 
the government's articulated intent with its practice. 337 To claim the 
discretion of a quality judgment program, the government must 
acknowledge responsibility for making quality judgments with respect to 
all of the private speakers subsidized by the program. 
These requirements thus far, .however, allow the government broad 
leeway to articulate and apply a "consistent with public values" access rule 
to almost 'any government-provided speech opportunity. This ability to 
subvert the private speech forum neutral access rules suggests that 
something more is required for the ~overnment to create and administer a 
legitimate quality judgments forum. 38 In Finley, the Court emphasized that 
identifying and promoting "excellent" expression was the primary purpose 
of the program,339 and that the NEA held a "mandate" to make these 
which courts should not interfere). 
334. ld. at 67S ("[C]ontrol over the treatment of public issues" is properly situated with 
.. licensees who are acCountable for broadcast performance") (quoting CBS, 412 U.S. at 124); ue 
also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, S29 U.S. 217, 23S (2000) ("When the 
government speaks, ... it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for 
its advocacy."). 
335. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, S3 V AND. L. REV. I, 49 (2000) 
("[C]lear identification of speech as the government's enhances accountability by pennitting the 
citizens to know what positions the government has taken and to reject them, if necessary. at 
election time:'). 
336. See Southworth, S29 U.S. at 229 (finding that, where government is "responsible for 
[speech's] content," the Coon will evaluate it as government speech). 
337. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., SIS U.S. 819,829 (199S) ("Once 
it has opened a limited forum. however, the State nmt respect the lawful boundaries it has itself 
set."). 
338: ld. at 832 (rejecting univenity's argument that its "substantial discretion in detennining 
how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish its educational mission" justified choosing between 
religious and nonreligious publications in allocating student publication funding). 
339. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, S24 U.S. S69, S73 (1998) (noting that 
establishment ofNEA represents a ''national pPlicy of support for the ..• arts in the United States," 
and criteria for grants include "artistic and cultural significance" and "professional excellence") 
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aesthetic judgments.340 Rather than being idiosyncratic to the program 
under review, these boundary-establishing elements are essential to the 
legitimacy of a government quality judgments program. 
The first requirement-that the government program be primarily 
directed to promoting "excellent'' expression-ensures accountability of 
the government's decision to enter and influence the marketplace of ideas. 
This means that the program must be established with a primary expressive 
goal clearly visible. While in other free speech contexts, that the 
government aims only incidentally at speech helps to validate its action,341 
the opposite is true when the government seeks to enter the speech market. 
"Incidental" quality-based speech judgments pose the great danger that 
they may be made unaccountably. 
The second requirement-that a government entity have a "mandate" 
to make quality-based judgments-ensures accountability of the decision 
to vest the responsibility for making quality-based judgments in a 
particular entity. The visibility of the vestiture helps to ensure that the 
entity charged with making the quality judgments bas some expertise to do 
so. That the entity has particular expertise reduces the risk of abuse of the 
discretion to discriminate. 
Moreover, the Court emphasized in Finley that the NEA grants were 
not only "selective," but were also "competitive."342 Scarcity alone does 
not justify discrimination that may be viewpoint-related. 343 Because of the 
purpose of the program, the need to make competitive decisions among 
applicants does justify such discrimination. 344 "Competitive" decisions in 
the context of a quality judgments program mean that qualified applicants 
are selected from a significantly larger pool. 34' This type of competitive 
selection process is essential to the legitimacy of a quality judgments 
program for several reasons. One is that such competitive decisions are 
necessary to ensure the prestige, and thus credibility, of the "excellent" 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 953(b). 954(c)(l) (1965)). 
340. ld. at 586. 
341. See United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367. 376-77 (1968) (holding that incidental 
restriction of speech is subject to less demanding review than government action aimed at speech 
directly). 
342. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 ('"The •very assumption' of the NEA is that grants will be 
awarded according to the 'artistic worth of competing applicants ••.. .,) (quoting Advocates for the 
Arts v. Thomson 532 F.2d 792. 795 (1st Cir. 1976). 
343. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 ('7he government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination 
among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity."). 
344. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88 ("[T]he Oovernment may allocate competitive funding 
according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal 
penalty at stake."). 
345. ld. at 585 (''The NEA bas limited resources. and it must deny the majority of the grant 
applications that it receives. including many that propose 'artistically excellent• projects."). 
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designation. If the government is to be able to claim the discretion of a 
speaker in making its quality based judgments. it must do more than rubber 
stamp applications. Its voice must make a meaningful statement. That a 
program is competitive in this way also provides a crucial political process 
guarantee against the risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination. That 
many do not receive the benefit helps ensure accountability ofquality 
decisions because the disadvantaged group includes politically powerful 
sources. 346 Where only a few are ''selected out" the gteat danger exists that 
purported "quality"~based judgments mask viewpoint discrimination in 
what is otherwise an open forum. 
Finally, another factor :that > supported the government-as-patron 
designation in Finley was that the government was spending money.347 In 
other contexts, the government's spending of money justifies 
discrimination among recipients that would violate the Constitution if done 
in the context of regulation.l48 In addition, accountability may be 
heightened when the government . spends money because funds are a 
limited resource, and so decisions about how· to spend them are highly 
visible.349 Although not dispositive when it is present, the factor of 
government spending is quite important when it is absent; for example, 
when the government program makes money rather than spends it. Not 
only does the lack of government spending make discrimination less 
visible, it also suggests that promoting ''excellent,. expression is not really 
the government's primary goal. 350 
These factors indicate that specialty license plate programs do not 
constitute legitimate quality judgments programs where "risky" 
346. Cf Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336U.S. 106~ 112-13 (1949) ("[There] is no more 
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. 
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to 
pick and choose only a few· to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political 
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger .numbers were affecte~."). 
347. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588 (''Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities."). 
348. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (stating that 
subsidy out of state's general fund can favor in-state residents); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. 
v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,93-94 (1984)(stating that, where state actS as market participant, it can 
favor its own residents)~ · 
349. See Healy, 512 U.S. at 211·12 (Scalia, J:, concurring) (noting, but not relying upon, a 
possible "important economic reality: A State is less likely to maintain a subsidy when its citizens 
perceive that the money (in the general fund) is available for any number of competing, 
nonprotectionist, pUrposes"). 
350. See lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Conscious.ness, Inc. v.lee, 505 U.S. 672. 682 (1992) (stating 
that status of airports as "commercial establishments funded by users fees and designed to make a 
regulated profit" and their need to ''provide services attractive to the marketplace" means that "it 
cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting 'the free 
exchange of ideas'"). 
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government discretion is justified by ''higher values."351 First, although 
some governments claim responsibility for some quality judgments about 
the content of specialty plates, they arguably do not claim responsibility for 
all. Second, even ifthe programs are viewed as generally granting access 
to plates "consistent with public values," the accountability guarantees are 
not met. Specialty plate programs do not state a primary purpose to 
_promote "quality" expression. Third, to the extent that they state a 
"consistent with public values" purpose, decisionmaking authority is 
vested in the legislature, which has no particular expertise to determine 
what constitutes "excellent" expression. Fourth, and quite importantly, 
specialty plate programs "~lect out" rather than "select in," creating the 
great danger of viewpoint discrimination. Finally, through these programs 
the governments make money rather than spend it. The accountability that 
attaches to government spending programs thus does not apply. For all of 
these reasons, specialty license plate programs do not constitute legitimate 
quality judgments programs where relaxed Free Speech Clause restraints 
' apply. 
B. Specialty License Plate Programs as Private Speech Forums 
The more obvious characterization of specialty license plate programs 
is as private speech forums. While the speech occurs on a government-
issued identifying mechanism and is limited by the space made available, 
its content is both advertised by th~ government and understood by the 
public as privately uttered. The wide range of plates made available and 
the fact that messages may contradict each other further confmn that the 
government has opened a previously unavailable speech opportunity to a 
class of private speakers. Courts reviewing the programs have 
characterized them as private speech forums. 352 If the specialty license 
plate programs are private speech forums, then "selectivity" limits apply. 
351. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 583-84 (rejecting as ''unlikely" respondents' claim tbat the NEA 
criteria "are sufficiently subjective that the agency could utilize them to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination''); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,674 (1998) (noting that 
.. risks of abuse" are tolerated to preserve "value" of editorial discretion). 
352. SonsofCoilfederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, Case No. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LBXIS 538, at *5-13; Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589,596 (B.D. La. 2000) (rejecting 
state's argument that specialty plate program does not create a forum for speech); Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Md. 1997) (applying forum 
rule of viewpoint neutrality without deciding the type of forum). But see Higgins v. Driver & Motor 
Vehicles Serv. Branch, 170 Ore. App. 542, 2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 175 I (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (en 
bane) ("We believe that the proper course is to view the communication that occurs on state license 
plates, including, custom [vanity] plates, as state communication rather than as communication by 
the plate holders or a combination of both."). 
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... 1. Viewpoint Discrimination 
In administering a private speech forum, the government may not 
discriminate according to viewpoint. The government does this when it 
permits speakers with some, but not all, viewpoints on a particular topic 
access to the forum. 353 Viewpoint neutral grounds for exclusion may relate 
to a speaker's popularity; for example, defining a "class" of speakers 
according to their elected or potentially electable status.354 It is not 
permissible, however, for the government-to evaluate viewpoints apart 
from the status or subject matter definitions of the forum. 355 
The current specialty license plate controversies present different 
viewpoint discrimination dangers. As one court bas already held, denying 
specialty plate access to the SCV logo because of the Confederate flag's 
message is viewpoint discrimination. 356 That state officials reacted to 
public opposition does not change this determination. 357 Thus, with respect 
to the Confederate flag plate, the governments' defenses of their specialty 
plate programs depend upon characterizing them as something other than 
private speech forums.· 
The "Choose Life" special~ plate controversies, at least in the states 
that have approved the plate,35 do not SO clearly ~emonstrate Viewpoint 
discrimination. While legislators acknowledge that they approved the plate 
because they approved of its message, in none of these states has a plate 
with a competing viewpoint been proposed and denied. 359 The wide range 
of plates available can support an inference of viewpoint neutrality, 
353. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,831 (1995). 
354. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 (finding that candidate was properly excluded from debate "not 
because of his viewpoint but because he had generated no appreciable public interest"); Perry Educ. 
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (finding that rival union was 
properly excluded "'based on the status" of not being the employees' elected representative). 
355. Rosenberger, SIS U.S. at 832 (finding that it was impennissible to deny funding to 
otherwise qualified student group because of its ''religious perspective"). 
356. Glendening, 954F. Supp. at 1103-04(statingthatviewpointdiscriminationinMaryland's 
SCV plate recall was "plain beyond dispute"). . 
357. ld. at 1104 ("A desire to stem listeners' reactions to speech is simply not a viewpoint· 
neutral basis for regulation.''). 
358. Even where state legislatures have refused to approve the ''Choose Ufe" plate, their 
reasons less clearly demonstrate viewpoint discrimination than in states denying plate access to the 
Confederate flag. See Tallcback Live, supra note 65 (stating that Virginia proposal changed from 
"Choose Ufe" to ''Choose Adoption," then stalled when the Senate Committee wanted to change 
the word ''Choose" as well). 
359. See Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 600 (B.D. La. 2000) (noting, but rejecting 
as defeating justiciability, defendants' argument that "plaintiffs have not alleged that they have 
actually gone through the process of obtaining a prestige plate''); Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99· 
583-CIV-J-~ 1-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at •21 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999) ("Since Plaintiffs 
have failed to even apply for the development of a specialty license plate which espouses their 
views under the Florida speciality [sic] plate statutory scheme, their claim is not ripe."). 
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making it dubious to detennine that the decision to approve a particular 
plate constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 360 So, with respect to the 
"Choose Life" plate, a government's defense of its specialty plate program 
as a private speech forum is facially plausible until the legislature denies 
approval to a plate with a competing point of view. 
Even when the administration of specialty plate programs is facially 
plausible because of lack of" evidence of viewpoint discrimination in 
approval or disapproval decisions, the question remains whether the 
program's structure meets the requirements of the Constitution. In 
particular, the lack of evidence with respect to the grounds for approval 
and disapproval decisions stems from the wide discretion that the 
legislature has to craft the law as coalitions of legislators see fit. The basic 
question that must be addressed with respect to all of the specialty license 
plate programs at issue is whether the Constitution permits the legislature 
to create and administer a private speech forum. 
2. The Separation of Powers Limit on a Legislature's 
Administration of a Private Speech Forum 
The question at the heart of the specialty plate controversies is the 
government's discretion to be "selective" in granting speech opportunities 
to private speakers. That a specialty plate program is characterized as a 
private speech forum means that constitutional limits on the government's 
ability to be selective in choosing among private speakers apply. Courts 
usually enforce these selectivity limits against the executive officials who 
administer most private speech forums, requiring clear access standards361 
and uniform application of them. 362 This is a familiar form of judicial 
review. Where the forum administrator is the legislature, however, such 
review is more problematic. Specifically, requiring guidelines, reasons and 
360. See Hildreth, 1999 U.S. Dist. LBXIS 22503, at *21 ("[The statute approving the '"Choose 
Ufe" plate] grants an opportunity for speech, but in no way does it prevent anyone's speech. No 
one is forced to carry the Choose Ufe license plate on his car. Florida motorists currently have 
thirty (30) other specialty plates and two (2) other regular license plates to choose from."). But see 
Henderson, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 601 ("By the very act of injecting 'the State's position which has 
been legislatively sanctioned' into a forum, First Amendment injury occurs."). 
361. See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass, Inc. v. Mass. BayTransp. Auth., 42 P.3d 1. 12 
(1st Cir. 1994) (finding transit authority's access policy so "vague and broad" that it leads to an 
unconstitutional uappearance of viewpoint discrimination,. in its application); Air Line Pilots Assn., ~ 
Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 4S F.3d 1144, I J54 n.S (7th Cir. 199S) (stating that 'CWte 
and morality [are] standards too vague to be enforced" in administering a private speech fonim). 
362. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,803-04 (1985) 
(looking at both "practice" and "policy'' to determine nature of private s~h forum); Air Une 
Pilots, 4S F.3d at II S3 (stating that "factual inquiry into consistent policy and practice is necessary'' 
to determine boundaries of a private speech forum). 
" 
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uniformity with respect to pieces of legislation is in dramatic tension with 
the legislature's ··constitutionally mandated range of discretion. 
Legislation is the most "selective" of government activities. Legislators 
can constitutionally vote fC!r or against proposed legislation for good 
reason, poor reason or no reason at all. 36 They are answerable to their 
constituents for their individual votes rather than to heightened 
constitutional standards of equal treatment. 364 Legislators have this 
discretion because the political process protections of the Constitution are 
the primary guarantee of the f~ess of the policy-based decision. 365 The 
political process protections are sufficient because the government's 
actions are visible, and so the government actors responsible are 
accountable for their decisions. 366 
By contrast, the Constitution's forum rules limit the government's 
ability to be "selective" as to the speakers who can gain access to the 
public property at issue. Most fundamentally, the Constitution imposes the 
equal treatment standard of viewpoint neutrality on the government when 
it chooses among private speakers. This standard applies because, in the 
context of making individual speech selection decisions, the politi~al 
process is an inadequate constitutional protection. In fact, not only is it 
inadequate, it is constitutionally perverse. The free speech guarantee 
protects minority speech, while the political process reflects majority 
will.367 - • 
The fundamental inconsistency of legislative selectivity and the limits 
of selectivity in a private speech forum indicate that the legislature cannot 
constitutionally run one. The ability, and perhaps obligation, of legislators 
to pass on individual applications as they pass on other pieces of 
legislation that is, to act according to "the . . . electorate's 
: 363. PoUtics, THEADVOCA TB, Mar. 29, 1998~ at 18 (describing senator who said that although 
"he normally votes agablst special license plates:' he will vote in favor of the Girl Scouts' 
application because '1 can't vote against mother, apple pie, Oirl Scouts and the president of the 
Senate [who sponsored the legislation and jokingly offered Girl Scout cookies as an inducement].''). 
364. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,461 (1981) (explaining that 
rational basis review applies to Equal Protection Clause challenge to economic legislation), 
365. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden,22U.S. (9Wheat.) 1., 245 (1824) ("Thewisdomandthediscretion 
of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at 
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole 
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which 
the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.") .. 
366. Cf. New York v. United States, 50S U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (stating that Congress must 
encourage state action so that ustate governments remain responsive to the local electorate's 
preferences (and] state officials remain accountable to the people"). 
367. See Bd of Regents ofUniv. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 120 S. a. 1346, 1357 
(2000) ('"The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same 
respect as arc majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon 
majoritarian consent."). 
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preferences"368-means that viewpoint considerations will almost certainly 
enter into some decisionmaking.369 The fact that legislators are not 
constrained by clear, objective standards and so can decide on the basis of 
viewpoint infects the forum. 370 The knowledge by potential applicants that 
legislators sponsor and approve legislation undoubtedly chills applicants. 371 
Th~se facts make a legislative attempt to run a private speech forum 
unconstitutional. 
A comparison among several of. the Confederate flag logo cases 
illustrates the difference, with respect to judicial review, of executive, as 
opposed to legislative, administration of a private speech forum. In Sons 
of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, the court noted that the 
Maryland Legislature, by statute, authorized the Motor Vehicle 
Administration (MV A) to issue specialty license plates to "qualifying non-
profit organizations. "372 The legislature, by statute, also provided the 
grounds by which an organization could ~'qualify" for the plates and by 
which an individual motor vehicle owner could obtain them. 373 Beyond 
status and payment requirements, the legislature . did not provide any 
grounds for rejecting particular applications. At the time that it recalled the 
SCV's Confederate flag 1ogo plate, the MVA had not issued more specific 
regulations with respect to specialty plates. Instead, it relied upon its 
regulations governing the issuance of personalized or "vanity" license 
plates. Specifically, it relied upon the regulation that al1ows the MV A to 
refuse to issue or recal1 a plate if "it could be considered objectionable or 
368. ld. 
369. See Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 140S. Ct. 2266,2276 (2000) ("[S]tudentelections 
that determine, by majority vote, which expr¢ssive activities shall receive or not receive school 
benefits ... do[] nothing to protect minority views but rather place[) the students who hold such 
views at the mercy of the majority."). 
370. See United Food & Commercial Workers Uni9n, Locall099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg. Transit 
Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 359 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining th~t, in administering a private speech forum, 
official's decision to limit access must be "constrained by objective criteria" and not rest on 
"ambiguous and subjective ~ns") (quoting Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Moreno 
Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
371. See Hildreth v~ Dickinson, No. 99-583wCJVwJ-21·A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at 
*1 0 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999) (noting, but rejecting as "legally speculative," "Plaintiffs' suggestion 
that the current political climate does not augur well for the passage ofa pro choice license plate 
law"); Gyan, supra note 115, at 1 B (noting that Plaintiffs' attorney argued that "it would be 'futile' 
~ . 
to him to get Louisjana lawmakers to vote for [some sort of pro choice plate]"). 
372. 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (D. Md. 1997). 
373. ld. ("To qualify for organization plates, a motor vehicle owner must satisfactorily 
demonstrate that he or she is a member of a nonprofit organization and is i~ compliance with MV A 
regulations. In addition, at least twenty-five owners of vehicles in a particular class must apply for 
the special registration plates, and at least twenty~five such plates must be issued initially. The 
vehicle owner must also pay a fee of $15 for the special organization registration plates.'') (citations 
omitted). 
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offensive as a term of bigotry, a term of hostility, an insulting or 
derogatory term, or a racially degrading term."374 Because the MV A was 
required to explain how its actions fit within its statutory mandate and to 
point to reasons within its broad statutory mandate that channeled its 
otherwise unconstitutionally broad discretion to choose among speakers, 
the court could identify the reason for the government action and compare 
it to the Constitution's free speech guarantee. In that case, the court held 
that the MV A's reason for recalling the SCV plate was based on 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 375 
Similarly, North Carolina courts were able to review and invalidate the 
state Division of Motor Vehicle's denial of specialty plates to the SCV.376 
In this instance, the challenge did not involve the Constitution's free 
speech guarantee, but rather statutory interpretation.~ The DMV 
Commissioner had denied the SCV' s specialty plate application based on 
her conclusion that the organization did not "meet the statutory criteria for 
a civic club."378 The court interpreted the statute, detennined its meaning 
according to the usual tools that detennine legislative intent, 379 and held 
that the DMV had erred in denying the SCV specialty plate application.380 
By contrast, SCV challenges to legislative action denying its plate 
applications must be more difficult because of the limits of judicial review. 
First, statutory boundaries such as those imposed in the North Carolina 
case will not apply in a meaningful way because courts will presume the 
legislature to know its own intent where tenns are ambiguous, and the 
legislature has the power to change unambiguous terms to meet new 
circumstances. Second, and more significantly, courts will have difficulty 
enforcing constitutional guarantees of equal treatment where the different 
treatment occurs not within a piece of legislation, but between different 
374. Jd. 
375. Id. at ll04('7heDefendants' actionsthroughoutthiswholecontroversy~lieanynotion 
that they acted in a viewpoint-neutral manner."). 
376. N.C. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner, 509 S.B.2d '}J)7, 209 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
377. /d. at 209 n.l (uSCV's emblem strikingly resembles the Confederate flag. We are aware 
of the sensitivity of many of our citizens to the display of the Confederate flag. Whether the display 
of the Confederate flag on state-issued license plates represents sound public policy is not an issue 
presented to this Court in this case. That is an issue for our General Assembly. We are presented 
only with the issue of whether SCV -NCO has complied with the language of [the statute], and note 
that allowing some organizations which fall within [the statute's] criteria to obtain personalized 
plates while disallowing others equally within the criteria could implicate the First Amendment•s 
restriction against content-based restraints on free speech!'). 
378. /d. at 209. 
379. I d. at 210 ("It is a well-established tenet of statutory construction that the intent of the 
General Assembly controls."). 
380. /d. at 211 ("[A]sSCV-NCDmeets thefourcriteriaenumerated by our General Assembly 
in [the statute], SCV-NCD qualifies for special registration plates!'). 
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ones. Where the different treatment is not apparent in one legislative 
action, it is more difficult for a court to identify-and charge the 
legislature with-unconstitutional discrimination. 381 So, for example, the 
Florida court reviewing the legislature's approval of the "Choose Life" 
plate found the authorizing legislation, alone, to prove nothing with respect 
to the plaintiffs' free speech rights. 382 While denial of an application more 
directly limits free speech rights, the problem for a court is identifying the 
reason for the denial as unconstitutional. While statutes usually contain a 
statement of purpose that can guide a court's inquiry, 383 legislatures do not 
publish reasons for failing to approve proposed legislation. Individual 
legislators may state their reas_ons for failing to vote for a piece of 
legislation, but courts are loathe to rely on these individual statements as 
evidence of legislative intent. 384 . 
The two recent cases involving legislatures' denial of the Confederate 
flag logo on specialty license plates illustrate these difficulties with 
discerning legislative intent. In Virginia, the SCV' s plate application, after 
much .lobbying and a number of public hearings, made it through the 
legislative committee to the full legislature~385 That body approved the 
plate without the flag logo. Before that body, the head of the legislature's 
Black Caucus had spoken against the flag logo, arguing that it sent a 
message of racial hatred. Media accounts linked the two eventssf!ving the 
"reason" for the logo denial as its racially offensive meaning. 3 But for a 
court to make this linkage in· a constitutional challenge is more 
problematic, as the court inust attribute one legislator's motive to others, 
and then find that combined motive to be the legislature's purpose. The 
Supreme Court has cautioned against making this linkage. 387 Although the 
· 381. Cf. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,200 (1994) (stating that, while both 
an "evenhanded tax" on milk producers and a subsidy from a general fund to in-state producers may 
be presumed valid despite possible "adverse effects on interstate commerce,'' combination of the 
two within one piece of legislation renders it invalid under the dormant commerce clause, which 
prohibits discrimination by a state against out-of-state economic actors). 
382. Hildreth v. Dickinson, No. 99-583-CIV-J-21-A, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22503, at •12 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999). 
383. A legislative statement of purpose, however, is not required. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 15 (1992) ('7o be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of 
rational .. basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time 
the purpose or rationale supporting its classification."). · 
384. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (411t is a familiar principle of 
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an oth~rwise constitutional statute on the 
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.'1. 
385. See supra Part I.A. 
386. Heyser & Knepler. supra note 175, at A16 (stating that the uspellbinding speech" was 
what ••compelled" a legislative compromise approving the SCV plate without the flag logo). 
387. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384 ( .. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently 
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district court in Virginia found the "motivation" behind the legislature's 
action to be unconstitutionally viewpoint-based, it relied on a finding that 
the legislature "targeted" the Confederate flag logo for disapproval after 
approving "hundreds" of others.388 This type of "stark, demonstration of 
discriminatory purpose,389 however, will rarely be present to the extent 
required to hinge a finding of invalid legislative action.upon it. 390 
The dispute in Tennessee further illustrates the difficulties with 
discerning legislative intent. There, the SCV' s plate application passed the 
Senate, but did not make it ·to the floor of the legislature. Instead, the 
House Calendar Committee "killed" it. Again, the media linked the 
procedural move with objections by black lawmakers. 391 For a court to find 
the legislature to have acted unconstitutionally by making such a move, 
which does not normally require explanation, would intrude upon the 
constitutionally guaranteed discretion of the legislature to act, in its 
processes, according to the interplay of political forces. 
The Louisiana court came ·closest to the mark when it invalidated the 
state legislature's approval of the "Choose Ufe" specialty plate on the · 
ground that free speech clause injury occurred because the state injected 
itself into what was supposed to be a viewpoint neutral speech forum. 392 
According to that court, ''Once a forum has been created which allows 
viewpoint discrimination, it is unconstitutional from the moment the 
discriminatory forum · is created."393 That court hinged its decision, 
however, on a finding that the state claimed the "Choose Life" message as 
its· own, a position not stated in the authorizing legislation and which a 
number of legislators and the state's governor publicly disputed. If it is the 
high for us· to eschew guessworlc. We decline to void [legislation] whi((h could be reenacted in its 
exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it."). 
388. SCVv. Holcomb, No. 7:99CV00530, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 538, at*14(W.D. Va. Jan. 
18, 2001). 
389. Gomillion v .. lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,341 0960). 
390. See Mazurek v. Annstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) ("We do not assume 
unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes produce harmful results.") (citing Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976)); Hunt v. Cromartie, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3206, at *14 (Apr. 1~. 
2000) (burden in Plantiffs to show that race motivated the legislature in drawing voting districts is 
a "demanding 'one") (quoting ·Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995). ("In the absence of a pattern as stark as 
thQse in Yiclc Wo [all Chinese applications denied] or Gomillion. impact alone is not determinative 
and the court must look to. other evidenc~ Qf race-based decisionmaking.") (quoting Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 (1977)); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 
341 (serpent·shaped voting district with dramatic racial impact provides "mathematical 
demon.stration" of discriminatory purpose); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 6~0. 646-47.(1993) (objective 
evidence may demonstrate discriminatory legislative purpose in "exceptional cases"). 
391. Humphrey, supra note 189, at A3. 
392. Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 600 (B.D. La. 2000). 
393. ld. at 601. 
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government's purpose to own the message_ that is constitutionally 
determinative, then the legislature could simply re-pass the authorizing 
statute with a careful statement disassociating itself from the message. The 
legislature's ability to do this, and thus immunize itself from meaningful 
judicial review, illustrates the more fundamental constitutional problem 
with the forum-that the legislature is administering it. It is the legislature's 
"unbridled discretion" to enact or reject particular pieces of legislation that 
is fundamentally inconsistent with what must be constitutionally channeled 
discretion "to permit or deny expressive activity" within a private speech 
forum.394 
V. STRUCTURING A CONSTITUTIONAL SPECIALTY LICENSE 
. PLATE PROGRAM 
Most current specialty license plate programs violate the Constitution 
because the legislative approval process encourages viewpoint 
discrimination in a private speech forum. Although the legislature must 
lose some control over the content of specialty license plates in order to 
make a program constitutional, the government more broadly need not 
abdicate all authority over the appearance of the state's license plates when 
it decides to run a specialty plate program. By following a few guidelines, 
a state can establish and administer a constitutional specialty license plate 
program. 
A Remove Approval of Individual Applications from the Legislature 
Like choosing which individuals will be subject to particular rules and 
prohibitions, choosing the speakers who may gain access to a private 
speech forum is properly an executive function. This separation of powers 
is necessary to ensure that a forum, which must be viewpoint neutral, is in 
fact so in application. The legislature must constitutionally delegate 
individual decisionmaking authority in a private speech forum to some 
entity outside the legislature so that the forum access decisions can be 
SUbject to meaningful judicial review. 395 . 
Most important is that the legislature already have a specialty plate 
approval process administered by a body outside the legislature, such as 
the state's department of motor vehicles.396 Some states have recently 
394. Id.(quotingCityofLakewoodv. PlainDealcrPubl'gCo.,486U.S. 750, 755-56(1988)). 
395. Cj. INS v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 954 n.16 (1983)(''Executive action under legislatively 
delegated authority ..• is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; 
and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to 
modify or revoke the authority entirely!'). 
396. See, e.g., SonsofConfederate Veterans,.lnc. v. Glendening, 954P. Supp.l099,1100(D. 
Md. 1997) (noting that the Maryland decisionmaking authority is vested in the Motor Vehicle 
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changed procedures397 or are considering doing so. 398 The decisionmaking 
authority can a~prove .. individual specialty plate application~ursuant to 
either general3 or more detailed statutory authorization. In either 
situation, the decisionmaker will understand that both the authorizing 
legislation and the constitutional equal access guarantees bound its 
discretion, and that in response to a challenge it must provide reas·ons for 
an access decision that demonstrate that it observed these boundaries. 
B. Establish Clear, Non-Viewpoint Discriminatory 
Access Standards 
Access to a private speech forum must be reasonable and not viewpoint 
discriminatory. Reasonableness refers to the compatibility of private 
speech with the other uses of the forum. 401 Because of the limited space on 
a license plate and its primary vehicle iden~ifying function, many access . 
rules will be reasonable. Specifically, states could eliminate specialty 
license plate programs entirely without constitutional impediment.402 The 
primary question, then, is whether an· access standard is viewpoint 
discriminatory on its face, or accords the decisionmaker sufficient 
discretion that the standard will permit viewpoint discrimination as 
applied. 
If an agency wants to retain the discretion to deny some specialty plate 
applications, it must promulgate regulations that it can uniformly and 
consistently apply to all specialty plate. applications. Such standards, 
articulated before an application denial, guard against claims of'''unbridled 
. ' 
Administration); N.C. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner, 509 S.B.2d 207, 210(N.C. 
Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the North Carolina decisionmaking authority is vested in the Division 
of Motor Vehicles). 
397. SCV South Carolina, .supra note 17. at B2 c• A South Carolina license plate bearing the 
Confederate battle flag will be the first produced under a new procedure for issuing specialty plates, 
the Department of Public Safety says."). · · 
398. SeeS. 1329, supra note 46 (moving specialty plate authorization from the legislature to 
the Department of Motor Vehicles). · 
399. See, e.g .• Faulkner, 509 S.E.2d at 210 (recognizing specialty plates "[i)ssuable to a 
member of a nationally recognized [tax exempt] civic organization"' that provides "at least 3000 
applications for that civic club plate"). 
400. SeeS. 1329, supra note 46 (requiring that groups applying for specialty license plates 
"not discriminate on the basis of race, nationality, religion, political party affiliation or sexual 
orientation"). 
401. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) ('-robe 
consistent with the First Amendment, the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not 
be based on the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the 
property:,.). 
402. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee. 50S U.S. 672, 683-85 (1992) 
(finding a solicitation ban in airport reasonable because of"(t)he inconveniences to passengers and 
the [congestion] burdens on [airport} officials"). 
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discretion't403 or "post-hoc policy formulation't404.that may "conceal a bias 
against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers.'~ The 
standards, of course, must be facially viewpoint neutral. Some access 
standards obviously . meet this requirement, such as those that require 
nonprofit status, marketing plans or initial purchase commitments. Other 
standards stated broadly in terms of "taste," "morality," "politics," or 
"controversy'' on their face pennit too much discretion by the decision 
maker to discriminate according to viewpoint. 406 
Less certain as to their constitutionality are standards between these two 
extremes. States commonly want to grant license plate access to private 
speakers, but limit "offensive" types of expression. In the context of vanity 
plates, where individual drivers choose their unique letter/number 
configurations, states commonly prohibit configurations that appear as 
vulgar sexual references, profanity or bate speech.407 To the extent these 
limitations are constitutional in the vanity plate context, they are 
constitutional in the specialty plate context as well.408 In particular, states 
can prohibit certain words and references that offend public sensibilities, 
so long as they do so clearly and consistently. 409 So, for example, 
Maryland's denial of logo plates with a naked Buddha or the letters 
"FU"410 could meet constitutional standards if Maryland had a clear and 
consistent policy of prohibiting sex depictions or references on license 
plates. 
But, while the vanity plate access standards may apply to specialty 
plates as well, once the access administration is moved to an administrative 
403. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co .• 486 U.S. 750,755 (1988). 
404. Air line Pilots Ass'n, lot' I v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 P.3d 1144, 1153 (7th Cir. 
1995) (''The government may not 'create' a policy to implement its newly-discovered desire to 
suppress a particular message."). 
405. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985). 
406. See, e.g •• Air Line Pilots Asm., 45 F. 3d at 1154 n.5 (holding that facton of "taste," 
"morality," and ''political" factors are "standards too vague to be enfon:ed"); see also Leslie Gielow 
Jacobs, The Public Sensibilitks Forum, NORnfWESTERN L. RBV. (forthcoming 2001) (setting out 
constitutionally permissible access standards for nonpublic forums, including "vanity»' license plate 
programs). 
407. See, e.g., McMahon v. Iowa Dep't ofThmsp., 522 N.W.2d Sl, 55 (Iowa 1994) (holding 
that state can choose to reject letter combinations that are .. sexual in connotation or otherwise 
offensive"); 761 IOWA ADMIN. CODE 401.6(32l)(d) (2001) ("No combination of characters shall 
be issued which is sexual in connotation: defined in dictionaries as a tenn of vulgarity. contempt. 
prejudice, hostility, insult, or racial or ethnic degradation: recognized as a swear word; considered 
to be offensive; or a foreign word falling into any of these categories."). 
408. See Jacobs, supra note 406 (setting out boundaries of a legitimate •'public sensibilities 
forum:• arguing that state vanity license plate programs can fall within it, and articulating 
permissible public sensibilities standards that limit the risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination). 
409. See id. · 
410. MVA to Revoke, supra note 130, at 1 A. 
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agency that is subject to judicfal review, a fundamental difference between 
the nature of the license plate ac~ess makes those standards probably less 
applicable in the specialty plate· context. The difference between the two 
types of plates is that, while vanity plate messages are often apparently 
trivial orindecipherable,411 specialty plates, by their nature, send a message 
of affiliation with a group or cause. Usually, these' messages do not contain 
specific words that can be identified as offensively sex-related, vulgar or 
hateful. Instead, public offense comes from dislike or disagreement with 
the group or cause. This type of viewpoint-related public "offense" cannot 
justify the government's denying access to a private speech forum.412 
Consequently, the constitutional applications of the vanity plate 
standards to· specialty plate applications will be few, while the temptation 
to use the standards· to suppress disliked viewpoints will be great. A 
comparison of vanity and specialty plate messages illustrates their 
difference. As to vanity plates, it should be constitutional for a-state agency 
to deny an application. for a "MOMN8ER" configuration,413 so long as· the 
policy prohibits hate configurations in general, or specific advocacy of 
hate, violence orinferioritydirected at any type of group ofpersons.414This 
is different, however, from a state agency prohibiting the SCV from 
displaying the Confederate flag as part of its trademarked logo. The 
message of the logo is one of affilia:tion with a group, not a directed 
expression of hatred.415 Absent the use of specifically defined words or 
images that offend public sensibilities in ways that can be stated generally, 
so as not to aim at particular viewpoints, the exclusion is unconstitutional. 
C. Administer the Program Consistently 
.A decisionmaker must ad.minister a specialty license plate program 
consistently. As the Court has emphasized, both "the policy and the 
practice of the government" are relevant to determine the extent to which 
41 t Elaine Viets, Vanity, Thy Name Is Licens.e Plate, ST. Lo1JIS POST-DISPATCH, INC., May 
S, 1992, at 3D (listing examples of"incomprehensible vanity license plates"). 
412. Jacobs, supra note 406 (arguing that while specific public sensibilities standards that have 
a primary application to the mode of expression can be constitutional in the license plates context, 
general standards that prohibit "offensive" expressions are unconstitutionally vague, leaving 
administrators. too much discretion to discriminate according to viewpoint). 
413. Judy Fahys, State's Tag Team Tries to Keep it Tasteful,· DMV Tries to Keep Tags 
Tasteful, THE SALT LAKE 'TRIBUNE, Oct. 17. 1991, at A 1 (vanity license plate configuration 
interpreted to mean "mormon hater" rejected by Utah DMV). 
414. See Jacobs, supra note 406 (arguing that such standards should be constitutional in the 
context of vanity license plates). 
· 415. See Dimmick v. Quigley, No. C96-3987S1 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1998) (order granting in 
part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary judgement), at 9 (distinguishing "HIV 
POS., vanity plate from those with "inherently offensive" racial slurs). 
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the government has opened a private speech forum.416 . Lower courts 
reviewing government agencies' administration of private speech forums 
have underscored that the access rules that the government can 
constitutionally enforce are those evidenced by its "consistent policy and 
practice."417 So, for example; while an administrator inay have the 
authority to deny access to some "sexually explicit speech and/or patently 
offensive" speech, it cannot allow access to some speech within that 
category but deny access to other speech "at least as sexually explicit 
and/or patently offensive."418 What is required is the application of"neutral 
standards ... quite p~isely.'9419 
In addition ~o clear, narrow standards, then, evidence of consistent 
enforcement will help demonstrate the constitutionality of a specialty plate 
program. Although record- keeping is not constitutionally required, it can 
help ensure and demonstrate consistency. With respect.to any application 
denial, a decisionmaker should explain its decisions according to 
established access guidelines, and should maintain ~ords of previous 
decisions as prec~ents to ell$ure unifonn application of the standards. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current legislatively-run specialty plate programs mix two 
constitutionally inconsistent conimands. The first is for legislators to enact 
laws that reflect the majority interests and values. The second is for them 
to administer a private speech forum in a way that does not discriminate 
according to viewpoint. The .conflicting mandates render it almost certain 
that the administration of a private speech forum by the legislature will 
result in viewpoint discrimination. The legislature's broad discretion to 
enact or fail to enact laws based upon its perception of the public interest 
make it almost impossible for courts to determine if the constitutionally 
prohibited viewpoint discrimination has occurred. 
. These observations lead to the conclusion that a legislature cannot 
constitutionally run a private speech forum. Of course states can choose to 
make specialty license plates available to their citizens. To do so, however, 
they must remove administration of the program from the legislature. With . 
clear, non-viewpoint discriminatory stand~, administered consistently 
by an entity subject to meaningful judicial review, a specialty license plate 
program can meet the Constitution's free speec~ guarantee. · 
416. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,802 (1985). 
417. AirLinePilotsAss'n,lnt'l v. Dep'tof Aviation ofChicago,45 F.3d 1144, 11S2 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
418. AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. ~ay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 10 Ost Cir. 
1994). 
419. ld. at ·13. 
